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L Introduction
"Where were the professionals?"' This infamous question posed by
U.S. District Court Judge Stanley Sporkin ignited a national debate on the
role of accountants and attorneys in the savings and loan debacle.2 Banking
regulators embraced this quotation as their rallying cry in malpractice
actions against attorneys and accountants.' Government regulators pursued
1. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990)
(upholding Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's seizure of Lincoln Savings and Loan
Association). Charles Keating, Jr., the chairman and chief executive officer of American
Continental Corporation, the parent of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, testified that
he had been so determined to do "the right thing" that he surrounded himself with "literally
scores of accountants and lawyers to make sure all the transactions were legal." Id. In
response to this testimony, Judge Sporkin, U.S. District Court Judge for the District of
Columbia and former Chief of Enforcement of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, lamented:
Where were these professionals, a number of whom are now asserting their rights
under the Fifth Amendment, when these clearly improper transactions were being
consummated? Why didn't any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from
the transactions? Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when
these transactions were effectuated?
Id.
2. Numerous commentaries in the popular press and scholarly journals quote Judge
Sporkin's blistering criticism. See, e.g., Editorial, Judgment on Lincoln S&L, WASH. POST,
Aug. 24, 1990, at A26 (editorializing that question of "[w]here were these professionals?"
served as "a charge to bar associations and accountancy boards to consider [the] enormous
failure of their professional standards to protect both clients and the public"); see also James
0. Johnston, Jr. & Daniel Scott Schecter, Introduction: Kaye, Scholer and the OTS - Did
Anyone Go Too Far?, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 977 (1993) (using Judge Sporkin's quotation
to introduce symposium issue on government regulation and legal ethics).
3. See Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multijurisdictional Practice -
Is Model Rule 8.5 the Answer, An Answer, or No Answer at All?, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 715,
785 (1995) (stating that government regulators invoked refrain of "where were the profes-
sionals?" in number of high profile cases against prominent law firms). For example, the
Office of Thrift Supervision's press release announcing its enforcement action against the
New York-based firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler stated that the action
addressed Judge Sporkin's question. See OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, OTS SEEKS $275
MUILON IN RESTITUTION; FREEZES ASSETS OF LINCOLN'S LAW FIRM (Press Release, Mar.
2, 1992).
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claims against hundreds of attorneys and accountants, including those
affiliated with prestigious law firms and accounting firms.4 These actions,
which sought millions in damages and restitution, threatened firm members
who practiced in general partnerships because the individual members could
be held personally liable if firm assets did not satisfy a malpractice judg-
ment.5 Claiming that the potential exposure to these suits was so high and
the defense costs so expensive, the professionals and their insurers paid
millions of dollars to settle the lawsuits.6 Ironically, the malpractice suits
against attorneys and accountants successfully galvanized these professionals
to obtain protection from future professional liability claims.7 Thereafter,
4. See Steve France, Unhappy Pioneers: S & L Lawyers Discover a "New Worl" of
Liability, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmICS 725, 726 (1994) (noting that in connection with failed
financial institutions, government sued at least twenty-two of largest two hundred law firms
in country). By 1995, law firms paid more than $400 million in settlements. Id. A flood
of litigation also hit accounting firms. Facing astronomical defense costs, many public
accounting firms, like law firms, opted to settle out of court. Julie Faussi6, Note, Limiting
Liability in Public Accounting Suits: A Desperate Appeal from a Beleaguered Profession, 28
VAL. U. L. REv. 1041, 1041, 1043 (1994) (citing interview with principal in accounting
firm and ARTHUR ANDEmSEN ET AL., THE LIABILrrY CRIsIs IN THE UNITED STATES: IMPACT
ON THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSIONAL, A STATEMENT OF POSMON 2, 3 (1992)). For
example, the accounting firm of Ernst & Young agreed to pay $400 million to settle claims
brought by federal banking regulators. Susan Schmidt, Ernst & Young Pays $400 Million
to Settle Thrift Regulator's Claims, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1992, at Al. The accounting
firm of Deloitte & Touche paid the second largest settlement of $312 million, and KMPG
Peat Marwick paid the banking regulators the third largest settlement of $187 million. Jerry
Knight, Fourth S & L Auditor Settles U.S. Lawsuits - KPMG Peat Marwick to Pay $187
Million, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1994, at Fl. In a report to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, the nation's six largest accounting firms stated that they faced $30
billion in claims related to failed savings and loan associations. Albert B. Crenshaw,
Accountants Plead for Relief - 6 Biggest Firms Say They Face $30 Billion in Liability
Claims, WASH. POST, June 12, 1993, at Dl.
5. See Thom Weidlich, Limiting Lawyers' Liability - LLPs Can Protect Assets of
Innocent Partners, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 7, 1994, at 1 (describing "partner's worst nightmare"
as when firm's assets and insurance will not cover malpractice claim so that malpractice
plaintiff comes after partner's "personal assets ... her house, her boat, her Lichtenstein
hanging on the wall").
6. Ed Hendricks & Mary Berkheiser, Where Were the Lawyers?, LITIGATION,
Summer 1992, at 30 (explaining that settlements left unanswered important questions of
liability and fault).
7. For an account of the different constituencies that supported the LLC movement,
see Wayne M. Gazur, The Limited Liability Company Experiment: Unlimited Flexibility,
Uncertain Role, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 179-81 (Spring 1995). One description
of the attorneys' efforts to garner support at the American Bar Association (ABA) Spring
1992 meeting indicated that the LLC was "being shown around this year's Tax Section
meeting like a new fighter plane at the Paris Air Show." Id. at 180 (citing Charles Daven-
port et al., ABA Tax Section Meeting: LLC Boosters Blitz Passthrough Session, 55 TAX
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a question on the whereabouts of professionals could easily be answered -
the professionals were actively lobbying state legislatures to limit the
vicarious liability of firm partners for the acts and omissions of other firm
partners.
These professionals sought legislation that would enable them to limit
their vicarious liability without having to organize as professional corpora-
tions and risk double taxation. The coalition of professionals and business
lobbyists successfully convinced state legislators to adopt legislation provid-
ing for limited liability companies and limited liability partnerships (collec-
tively called "limited liability firms"). Because limited liability firms
provide liability protection without subjecting firms to double taxation,
these new limited liability structures rapidly gained popularity. As de-
scribed by a partner in a large Boston law firm, big firm partners look at
limited liability firms with "an enthusiasm perhaps more appropriately
reserved for the Holy Grail. "8
The flurry of firms to reorganize as limited liability firms reflects the
enthusiasm for the new business structures. Within a few years, the limited
liability firm movement swept the country.9 Those firms that have not yet
organized as limited liability firms probably will consider doing so in the
future.1" When they do, there may be little opposition to converting to a
limited liability firm because attorneys have wholeheartedly embraced the
limited liability firm structure.1
Noms 1019 (1992)).
8. Lisa Isom-Rodriguez, Limiting the Perils of Partnership, AM. LAw., July-Aug.,
1993, at 30 (quoting Michael Bohnen, partner at Boston's 117-lawyer firm of Nutter,
McClennen & Fish and author of Massachusetts LLP bill).
9. As of December 1995, forty-seven states had enacted LLC statutes and thirty-five
states had enacted LLP legislation. John W. Simpson, L.L. C. and L.L.P. Format Can
Benefit Law Firms, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 1, 1996, at BIl. Some states, like Rhode Island, do
not permit attorneys to practice as LLCs, and regulators in some states have not determined
if attorneys can organize as LLPs. Id.
10. Robert R. Keatinge & George W. Coleman, The Right Entity May Limit Your
Liability, LAW PRAC. MGMT., July-Aug. 1995, at 22. As stated by Robert R. Keatinge,
partner of the Denver-based firm of Holland & Hart and chair of the ABA Business Law
Section Partnership Committee's Subcommittee on LLCs, the LLC is "clearly the hottest
topic in law today, at least when it comes to practice management." Richard C. Reuben,
Added Protection, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1994, at 54, 55-56.
11. See Peter Blackman, Limited Liability Option - Experts Weigh the Pros and Cons
of Converting, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 25, 1994, at 5 (noting that "across the board" corporate and
tax attorneys hail advent of LLCs and LLPs). A few attorneys express some reservations
with the understanding that the limited liability shield only matters when the firm exhausts
all assets and faces extinction. Id. (quoting Kaye, Scholer partner).
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Commentators also herald the coming of the limited liability firm.
Even the titles of law review articles reflect how authors have warmly
received limited liability firms.1 2 Although a plethora of these articles
discuss the features and advantages of these limited liability firms, a rela-
tively small number of the articles question the advisability of law firms
rushing to reorganize as limited liability firms.13 The paucity of articles
scrutinizing the limited liability form suggests that commentators have
devoted little attention to analyzing the negative implications of attorneys'
practicing in limited liability partnerships or limited liability companies.14
Similarly, in converting their practices to limited liability firms, attorneys
may overlook the consequences of abandoning the traditional partnership
structure. They may not realize how conversion to a limited liability
partnership (LLP) or a limited liability company (LLC) completely trans-
forms the dynamics and culture of law firm practice, creating financial and
administrative problems.' 5 This Article considers some of the unintended
consequences of attorneys' limiting their vicarious liability in limited
liability firms. After Part II reviews the forces behind the limited liability
movement and the emergence of limited liability law firms, Part m surveys
the statutory approaches to limiting vicarious liability in LLCs and LLPs.
Part IV then examines possible internal consequences of attorneys' practic-
ing as limited liability firms. Using an economic analysis to evaluate
possible outcomes of attorneys' limiting their vicarious liability through
limited liability firms, Part V turns to the external effects of the elimination
12. See David B. Rae, LbnitedLiability Partnership: The Tune to Become One Is Now,
Hous. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 47, 49 (concluding that "[t]here does not appear to be any
significant reason for a professional partnership not becoming an LLP"). See generally B.
Todd Bailey & Rick D. Bailey, The Idaho Limited Liability Company: In Search of the
Perfect Entity, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (1994); David L. Cameron, Strike Up the Band: The
Limited Liability Company Comes to Oregon, 30 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 291 (1994) (singing
praises of LLCs).
13. For an insightful analysis of some of the problems of LLPs, see Robert Hamilton,
Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1065, 1076-87 (1995). Surprisingly, law students have written two other critical
pieces. See generally Thomas A. Denker, Note, Lawyers and Limited Liability for Arizona's
Professionals: Deliverance or Damnation?, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 355 (1995); N. Scott Murphy,
Note, ItIs Nothing Persona" The Public Costs of Limited Liability Law Partnerships, 71 IND.
L. J. 201 (1995).
14. Another author made this observation in explaining that most articles praise the
advent of limited liability firms. See Murphy, supra note 13, at 203.
15. In his testimony criticizing the Texas LLP provisions initially proposed, partner-
ship expert, Professor Alan R. Bromberg, called the proposal a "radical restructuring" of
partnership law. Walter Borges, Partners'Liabiity Bill Hits Rough House Waters, TEX. L.,
May 13, 1991, at 7.
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of vicarious liability. After showing how the limited liability rules under
LLP and LLC legislation adversely affect incentives to assure quality legal
services, Part VI proposes an alternative approach to limited liability that
eliminates strict vicarious liability for the acts and omissions of partners,
while creating incentives for firms to monitor attorney conduct through
reasonable risk management controls. This alternative approach limits
attorneys' liability while protecting clients and other members of the
public.16
II. Genesis of Limited Liability Firms
A. Emergence of Limited Liability Companies
The rush by professionals to organize limited liability firms actually
started with a mineral venture in Wyoming. In 1977, Wyoming passed the
first LLC statute as special legislation designed to assist a particular mineral
concern that wanted to organize a business entity offering limited liability
to all equity participants, while avoiding taxation on the entity level.17
Pursuant to this authority, the mineral concern organized as an LLC and
obtained a private letter ruling from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that
the company would be classified as a partnership."8 Thereafter, the IRS
spent six years studying the issue of classification of unincorporated associ-
ations. 19 Following this study, the IRS released Revenue Ruling 88-76, a
public revenue ruling concluding that an LLC with limited liability and
centralized management under Wyoming law would be classified as a
partnership for federal tax purposes.'m This public revenue ruling served
as a springboard for other states to jump on the LLC bandwagon." In an
16. This Article does not analyze the ethical rules that relate to attorneys limiting their
vicarious liability. For a discussion of these ethical considerations, see Robert R. Keatinge
& George W. Coleman, Practice of Law by Limited Liability Partnerships and Limited
Liability Companies, 1995 PROF. LAW. SYMp. 5, 12-13.
17. Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company: Evidence of a Race
Between the States, But Heading Where?, 45 SYRACuSE L. Rav. 1193, 1199 (1995).
18. Id. at 1200 (citing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 18, 1980)).
19. According to the study, the limited liability feature of LLCs should not, by itself,
prevent an LLC from being classified as a partnership. Id. at 1202 n.51.
20. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
21. Statistics illustrate the importance of the public IRS revenue ruling. Larry E.
Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus. LAw. 1, 3 (1995). As
explained by Professor Ribstein, by 1988, eleven years after the enactment of the Wyoming
statute, only Florida had enacted a LLC statute and only twenty-six LLCs were organized
in Wyoming. Id. By the end of 1994, forty-six other states had adopted LLC statutes and
"tens of thousands of LLCs had been formed." Id.
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attempt to compete for investment capital and tax revenues, "state legisla-
tors willingly traded off limited liability in the hope of luring new busi-
nesses that might otherwise migrate to states with LLC legislation. "I States
did not want to be left behind as other jurisdictions authorized the new
business forms.'
Professionals in coalition with business groups helped push LLC legis-
lation through the states.24 Attorneys and accountants believed that the LLC
provided the "best of both worlds" in allowing persons to limit their liabil-
ity while avoiding disadvantageous corporate taxation.' In response to
professionals' lobbying initiatives, several states, including Alabama,
Arkansas, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
Oregon, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming, explicitly authorized professionals
to practice as LLCs. 6 Another fifteen states implicitly authorized profes-
22. Karen C. Burke, The Uncertain Future of Limited Liability Companies, 12 AM.
J. TAX POL'Y 13, 21 (1995). As suggested by Professor Burke: "The recent surge of
interest in LLCs raises important issues concerning the role of regulatory and tax constraints
on business form, as well as the responsiveness of state legislatures to interest group politics
and competition for investment capital." Id. at 15.
23. Goforth, supra note 17, at 1272 (noting that in "virtually every state, those respon-
sible for drafting and/or enacting LLC legislation cite motives which relate to attracting
business and revenue to the state, or avoiding the loss of such business and revenues to other
states").
24. See Burke, supra note 22, at 20-21 (explaining that combined interests of small
business and organized bar groups faced "weak opposition" because LLCs posed no threat
to "powerful interest groups"). The "voluminous support" of those groups, outweighed the
opposition initially mounted by trial lawyer associations. Goforth, supra note 17, at 1279.
In some states, like Washington, the trial lawyers convinced the legislature to require that
professional LLCs carry a minimum level of malpractice liability insurance. Id. at 1281.
25. See Lawrence H. Brenman, Service Businesses Switch to LLC, 11 J. PARTNERSHIP
TAX'N 167, 168 (1994) (describing major benefits of LLCs to service providers). Prior to
the emergence of the LLCs, professionals could only obtain limited liability by organizing
as professional corporations subject to taxation at the corporate level, unless the corporation
qualified for partnership taxation under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. State
laws which require that all members of professional corporations be licensed in the state of
incorporation also prevent multi-state firms from incorporating. See Jimmy G. McLaughlin,
The Limited Liability Company: A Prime Choice for Professionals, 45 ALA. L. REV. 231,
259 (1993).
26. Alson R. Martin, Limited Liability Companies (LLCs): The New Game in Town,
in ESTATE PLANNING FOR THE FAMILY BusINEss OWNER 89, 128 (1994). Maryland,
Oregon, and Virginia changed their statute to permit professionals to practice as LLCs after
initially adopting legislation explicitly prohibiting professionals from using the LLC form.
Allan G. Donn, The Best Entity for Doing the Deal - Limited Liability Entities for Law
Firms, in THE BEST ENTrrY FOR DOING THE DEAL 237, 240 (PLI Corp. L. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 937, 1996) (providing comprehensive listing of state legislation by
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 717 (1997)
sionals to use the LLC form by providing that LLCs could be organized for
"any lawful purpose."I Rhode Island expressly prohibited LLCs from
providing professional services.'
B. Emergence of Limited Liability Partnerships
While professionals in other states sought approval to limit their
liability through LLCs, Texas attorneys spearheaded a different initiative to
limit their liability - the LLP. The LLP initiative grew out of the collapse
of real estate and energy prices in the late 1980s and the resultant collapse
of Texas financial institutions.29 Following the failure of a number of
Texas financial institutions, banking regulators pursued actions against the
institutions' officers, directors, and professional advisers, including the
institutions' former counsel. These claims captured the attention of the
legal community because the amount of alleged damages far exceeded the
amount of the insurance coverage carried by the target law firms. Attor-
neys could not fathom the possibility of their personal, nonexempt assets
being subject to execution for judgment arising from their partners' mal-
practice. This concern spurred attorneys' interest in seeking legislative
changes to limit their vicarious liability.
Partners of a twenty-one person Lubbock, Texas law firm originated
the idea of changing partnership law to limit professionals' vicarious liabil-
ity. The first senate bill encompassing this idea obtained a "very negative
reception" for a number of reasons, including the facts that it only covered
professionals and that it would be considered a "help-a-lawyer-bill." 3
Critics also objected to the original bill because it relieved parties of re-
sponsibility for the misconduct of persons they directed and supervised,
failed to signal to third parties that the new entity limited liability, and
category). For an actual discussion of the different statutory approaches used to authorize
professionals to practice as LLCs, see Dirk G. Christensen & Scott F. Bertschi, LLC Statutes:
Use by Attorneys, 29 GA. L. REv. 693, 695-96 (1995).
27. Christensen & Bertschi, supra note 26, at 696 ("Because the practice of a profession
by a licensed individual is lawful, these statutes imply that a limited liability company can
render professional services.").
28. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-3 (Supp. 1996) ("Every limited liability company organized
under this chapter has the purpose of engaging in any business for which a limited partnership
may carry on, except the provision of professional services.").
29. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1069 (noting that Texas led nation in number of
financial institution failures, with more than one-third of nation's banking failures). For a
personal account of the events leading to the adoption of the nation's first LLP legislation, see
id. at 1074.
30. See id. at 1073 (acknowledging that author's first reaction to proposed legislation
was negative).
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failed to provide a substitute source of recovery (i.e., insurance).3 ' After
partnership expert Professor Alan R. Bromberg criticized the bill, legisla-
tors asked him to propose amendments.32 Professor Bromberg's revisions
addressed objections to the bill by:
(1) Extending the liability limitation to all partnerships,
(2) Denying protection to partners for misconduct of those working
under their supervision or direction,
(3) Requiring annual registration with the state and inclusion of "L.L.P."
or "registered limited liability partnership," in the firm name, and
(4) Requiring liability insurance in an arbitrary and admittedly often
inadequate amount of $100,000.' 3
With these revisions, the proponents of the bill "quietly attached" it to an
omnibus bill "that authorized limited liability companies and included
significant amendments to existing corporation and partnership statutes. "I
Sections of the Omnibus Business Association Act of May 20, 1991
amended and added provisions to the Texas Uniform Partnership Act to
create a new type of partnership, a registered LLPY
The LLP spark that started in a small West Texas town "spread like
wild fire" to the rest of the state and throughout the nation.36 The LLP
structure appeals to members of professional partnerships because they can
continue to function as general partnerships while limiting partners' vicari-
ous liability for other partners' malpractice. Unlike the LLC, the LLP does
not require the creation and administration of an entirely new type of busi-
31. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED
LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1.01(a), at 3
(1995).
32. Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1073-74. In his testimony on the LLP proposal,
Professor Alan R. Bromberg identified two problems: "It's not needed, and it's poor public
policy." Borges, supra note 15, at 7. Professor Bromberg also referred to the bill as "highly
discriminatory, in that it protects those who need it least." Id. He noted that partners in
successful partnerships usually make large incomes, own many personal assets, and can afford
insurance. Id.
33. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 31, § 1.01(a), at 3-4.
34. Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1074.
35. Steven A. Waters & Matthew D. Goetz, Annual Survey of Texas Law - Partner-
ships, 45 Sw. L.J. 2011, 2022 (1992).
36. Within two years of the enactment of the Texas LLP legislation, 569 Texas firms
elected LLP status. See Why 569 Texas Law Firms Just Switched to LLP, LAW OFF. MGMT.
& ADMIN. REP., Apr. 1994, at 94-1 (quoting staff attorney with Texas Secretary of State's
office). By July 1996, forty-five states had adopted LLP legislation and the remaining states
were considering adopting LLP legislation. An Important Matter for State Bar Members, W.
VA. LAW., July 1996, at 27.
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ness entity.37 Moreover, the LLP enables members to continue the tradition
of holding themselves out as partners. Citing the advantages of LLPs,
attorneys and accountants marshaled support for enactment of LLP legisla-
tion. 8 Some LLP statutes expressly allow professionals to practice as LLPs
while others do not specifically address the ability of professionals to prac-
tice as LLPs.
Even in those states that expressly allow professionals to practice as
LLPs or LLCs, the appropriate state body that regulates the practice of law
must approve attorneys which use a limited liability structure.39 For exam-
ple, a Nebraska State Bar Association ethics opinion prohibits attorneys
from forming LLCs despite the fact that the Nebraska LLC statute expressly
authorizes professionals to practice as LLCs. Thus, as a final hurdle,
professionals must obtain approval from the appropriate regulatory authority
in order to use a limited liability structure.4" Otherwise, firm attorneys
could be denied the desired liability shield.
37. See Larry Smith, LLPs: Politically, A Ripe Time for Firms to Act, COUNSEL, Aug.
16, 1993, at 2 (discussing administrative ease in converting to LLP and other practical
advantages of LLPs).
38. The accounting profession, led by the Accountants' Coalition, joined the push for
enactment of LLP legislation. Dan L. Goldwasser, As the Dust Settles, in ACCT. LIABILITY
1995, at 9, 21-22 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 526, 1995)
(asserting that adoption of LLP and LLC laws, which reduce liability exposure of accountants,
"will encourage competent CPAs to practice in large firms in which they have little or no
control over the actions of their partners").
39. The ABA and many state bar associations have already concluded that attorneys can
limit their liability through LLCs and LLPs. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-401 (1996) (concluding that Model Rules of Professional
Conduct permit attorneys to practice in limited liability entities provided certain conditions are
met). Court opinions rarely cite or rely on these advisory bar association opinions. See
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs § 2.6.6 (1986). For a review of the ethics
opinions and state rules allowing attorneys to practice law in LLCs, see Christensen & Bert-
schi, supra note 26, at 756-58. A review of the state ethics opinions indicates that some states
allow attorneys to practice in LLCs without qualifications. See, e.g., State Bd. of Tex.
Professional Ethics Comm'n, Op. 486 (undated) (concluding that no provision in Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits attorneys from practicing as LLC). Other
states impose additional conditions. For example, Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 265
requires that equity owners in professional companies remain personally liable for the
organization's professional acts, unless the organization itself carries professional liability
insurance meeting certain standards. David C. Little, Changes in the Rule Authorizing
Professional Corporations, COLO. LAW., Mar. 1996, at 67, 68.
40. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 94-1 (1994) (prohibiting Nebraska attorneys
from practicing as LLCs until "[state] supreme court enacts rules specifically authorizing [that
form of practice]").
41. If a state's highest court concludes that the limited liability structure violates applica-
ble ethics rules or public policy, the court could refuse to recognize the limited liability shield.
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I1. Statutory Approaches to Limiting Liability
The limited liability shield provided by LLPs and LLCs varies from
state to state.42 Initially, when Texas adopted the first LLP statute, the
key difference between an LLP and an LLC was that an LLP only lim-
ited partners' vicarious liability for tort claims, whereas an LLC limited
vicarious liability for all claims. More recent LLP legislation drops this
distinction by eliminating vicarious liability for both tort and contract
claims.43
In rejecting the statutory liability shield, courts could rely on the inherent powers doctrine,
which holds "that courts, and only courts, may regulate the practice of law." Charles W.
Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation - The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine,
12 U. ARK. LrrImEROCK L.J. 1, 3 (1989-90) (emphasis omitted); see First Bank & Trust Co.
v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675-76 (Ga. 1983) (concluding that shareholders in professional
corporation cannot limit their vicarious liability). Thirteen years later, in a surprising reversal
of position, the Georgia Supreme Court overruled Zagoria "to the extent that it states that this
court, rather than the legislative enabling act, determines the ability of lawyers to insulate
themselves from personal liability for the acts of other shareholders in their professional corpo-
ration." Henderson v. HSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 471 S.E.2d 885, 886 (Ga. 1996). This reversal
illustrates the difficulty in predicting how courts will handle the statutory liability limits.
Referring to the "perpetual state of flux," one commentator warns attorneys against assuming
that courts will uphold the liability shield. Debra L. Thill, Comment, The Inherent Powers
Doctrine and Regulation of the Practice of Law: Will Minnesota Attorneys Practicing in
Professional Corporations or Limited Liability Companies Be Denied the Benefit of Statutory
Liability Shields?, 20 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 1143, 1176 (1994).
42. Most states enacted their LLC legislation without the benefit of a uniform or
prototype act. Jennifer J. Johnson, Limited Liability for Lawyers: General Partners Need Not
Apply, Bus. LAW., Nov. 1995, at 85, 102 n.69 (explaining that version of jurisdiction's
limited partnership act served as basis for many LLP statutes with certain provisions drawn
from general business corporation law). In 1993, the Subcommittee on General Partnerships
and Unincorporated Business Associations of the ABA Section on Business Law released a
Prototype Limited Liability Company Act (Prototype Act). The Prototype Act is reprinted in
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 31, app. B. The Prototype Act formed the basis for
statutes enacted since the Prototype Act was released. Johnson, supra, at 102. Thereafter,
in August 1994, the National Conference of Commission on Uniform State Laws approved the
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, which has since been redrafted. UNIF. LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY AcT (ULLCA), 6A U.L.A. 425 (1995).
43. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08 (West Supp. 1997) (limiting
partner's liability for debts and obligations of partnership "arising from errors, omissions,
negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance... committed by another partner or a representa-
tive of the partnership"), with N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26(b) (McKinney Supp. 1997)
(expanding LLP liability protection to provide that "no partner... is liable or accountable,
directly or indirectly (including by way of indemnification, contribution or otherwise), for any
debts, obligations, or liabilities of, or chargeable to, the registered limited liability partnership
or each other, whether arising in tort, contract or otherwise .... solely by reason of being
such a partner").
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LLCs afford owners the same limited liability enjoyed by corporate
shareholders along with flow-through partnership tax benefits.' Under all
LLC statutes, the LLC remains liable for all company liabilities, including
liability resulting from any negligent or wrongful act of its members or
employees.45 Individual members also remain liable for their own miscon-
duct.46 LLC statutes then either implicitly or expressly limit members'
vicarious liability for tort claims.47 For example, the District of Columbia
statute states that "[n]o member of a professional limited liability company
shall be so personally liable and accountable merely because of such mem-
ber's membership interest in the professional limited liability company."18
Statutes which implicitly limit liability do so by providing that a member
is liable only for that member's own negligence.49
Similarly, LLP provisions take different approaches to providing a
liability shield. Most states follow the Texas model, adopting LLP legisla-
tion that only eliminates vicarious liability for tort claims. Understanding
that clever plaintiffs could attempt to plead around such a statutory limit by
alleging some malpractice theory of liability other than negligence, some
state legislators broadened the liability shield to eliminate vicarious liability
for misconduct, whether characterized as tort or contract or otherwise.'
44. Johnson, supra note 42, at 102. This Article uses the terms "partners" or "mem-
bers" to refer to owners of LLCs.
45. Brian L. Schorr, Limited Liability Companies: Features and Uses, in FORMING
AND USING LIMITED LiABiLrry COMPANIES 1993, at 196 (PLI Corp. L. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 805, 1993).
46. The Comments to the ULLCA explain that the language in the Act which states
that LLC members have no liability for firm obligations "solely" due to their membership
status does not relieve a member of liability for the member's own conduct. See ULLCA
§ 303 cmt. Furthermore, agency law holds "actors . . . responsible for their personal
actions even when carried out as agents for another entity." Johnson, supra note 42, at 91
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958)). Finally, ethical rules in every
jurisdiction prohibit or restrict attorneys' attempts to limit their liability prospectively. Id.
47. Christensen & Bertschi, supra note 26, at 701 (referring to appendix that sets forth
pertinent portions of various statutes).
48. D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-1314 (1996).
49. By limiting a member's liability to that member's own negligence, a statute
"implies that a member that was not involved in the negligent act or omission enjoys limited
liability." Christensen & Bertschi, supra note 26, at 702.
50. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 15015 (West Supp. 1996) (protecting partners from
another partner's malpractice, whether claim sounds in tort, contract, or otherwise); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1515(b) (Supp. 1994) (same); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.782(1) (West
Supp. 1996) (same). In the opinion of one commentator, this statutory language addresses
the "diverse character of malpractice claims by providing protection against tort claims and
all claims resulting from the provision of professional services, whether arising in tort or
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Some of the most recent LLP statutes, such as those enacted in Minnesota
and New York, go one step further in providing partners full protection
against vicarious liability for all obligations of the firm.5'
A. Provisions Conditioning Limited Liability on Insurance
Another difference in the liability provisions in LLP and LLC statutes
relates to insurance requirements. Some LLP and LLC statutes provide that
the liability shield only applies if the LLP or LLC carries some requisite
amount of insurance coverage.' Other statutes do not condition liability
protection on maintaining some level of insurance or providing evidence of
financial responsibility.53
The amount of insurance required varies from state to state. For
example, the Texas LLP provisions require at least $100,000 of liability
insurance.' Recognizing the skyrocketing costs of litigation and the actual
exposure for attorneys and firms, the Delaware statute increases the mini-
mum amount of insurance to $1,000,000 and California increases the
amount to $100,000 times the number of attorneys in the. LLP, up to
$7,500,000. 55 Although the amount of required insurance coverage varies
contract." Johnson, supra note 42, at 109.
51. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14(2) (West Supp. 1997) ("A partner of a
limited liability partnership is not, merely on account of this status, personally liable for
anything chargeable to the partnership under Sections 323.12 [wrongful acts] and 323.13
[breach of trust], or for any other debts or obligations of the [LLP].").
52. In viewing insurance or asset segregation as a substitute for individual partner
liability, the insurance or segregation of assets should be in effect at the time of suit in order
for the liability shield to apply. See BROMBERG & RiBsTEiN, supra note 31, § 2.06(c), at
53.
53. For example, the New York LLP provisions do not mandate insurance coverage.
See N.Y. PARTNmSHIP LAW, Article 8-B practice commentaries, at 111 (McKinney Supp.
1997) ("Unlike some other states... New York does not prescribe certain levels of mal-
practice or other insurance or maintaining certain financial responsibility for a RLLP.").
54. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-45-C(1) (West Supp. 1997). The Texas
provisions now allow the following alternative to insurance:
$100,000 of funds specifically designated and segregated for the satisfaction of
judgments against the partnership based on the kinds of errors, omissions, negli-
gence, incompetence, or malfeasance for which liability is limited .. by
(i) deposit in trust or in bank escrow of cash, bank certificates of deposit,
or United States Treasury obligation; or
(ii) a bank letter of credit or insurance company bond.
Id.
55. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1546(a) (1993 & Supp. 1994) (requiring at least
$1,000,000 of liability insurance "of a kind that is designed to cover the kinds of...
misconduct for which liability is limited by § 1515(b) of this title and which insures the
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from state to state, legislatively mandated insurance addresses the concern
that the elimination of vicarious liability leaves malpractice plaintiffs
without recovery in the event of a judgment.56 Still, most statutory amounts
appear to be inadequate, considering the escalating costs of defense and the
size and frequency of malpractice claims.'
B. Provisions Relating to Supervisory Liability
The vicarious liability provisions of LLP and LLC statutes also vary
in their treatment of supervisory liability for other persons' acts or omis-
sions. Only a few LLC statutes extend a member's personal liability to
cover acts or omissions of persons who that member directly supervises or
controls. 8 The vast majority of the LLC statutes do not refer to supervi-
sory liability, effectively limiting a member's personal liability to that
member's own conduct. 9
On the other hand, most LLP statutes provide for some degree of
personal liability for the conduct of supervised persons.' LLP statutes use
different approaches in recognizing personal liability for supervised per-
sons. Most statutes indicate that the limited liability provisions "'do not
affect' the liability of partners or members for their own acts or the acts of
those they directly supervise."6" Some suggest this liability by "negative
partnership and its partners"); CAL. CORP. CODE § 15052(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
56. As explained by Professor Deborah Rhode, "many valid civil liability claims go
unredressed because the lawyer has insufficient insurance or personal assets." Deborah L.
Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 697 (1994).
57. Most legal malpractice policies now require that defense costs be subtracted from
the limits of liability, thus reducing the amount remaining to pay judgment or settlements.
Andrew S. Hanen & Jett Hanna, Legal Malpractice Insurance: Exclusions, Selected Coverage
and Consumer Issues, 33 S. TEX. L. REv. 75, 148 (1992).
58. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-846 (1989 & West Supp. 1996); N.Y.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LAW § 1205 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
59. Johnson, supra note 42, at 104 n.75 (citing LLC statutes that do not make reference
to supervisory liability). One commentator views the question of supervisory responsibility
under these statues as an "evolving issue" to be resolved. See McLaughlin, supra note 25, at
245 n.127.
60. See Johnson, supra note 42, at 112. Compare Model Rule 5.1(a), which states: "A
partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect
measures giving reasonable assurance that all awyers in the firm conform to the rules of
professional conduct." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1(a) (1995)
(amended 1996). In discussing Model Rule 5.1, one commentary suggests that LLP statutes
incorporate the concept of supervisory responsibility. Robert R. Keatinge et al., Limited
Liability Companies, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: INTO THE MAINSTREAM, Q229 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 1, 122 (1994).
61. See Johnson, supra note 42, at 112.
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inference" from language that gives partners "limited liability for firm debts
arising from the acts of others 'not under the direct supervision and control'
of the member or partner."62 Other statutes expressly state that attorneys
"shall be" liable for persons they directly supervise and control.'
Some statutes that recognize supervisory liability do not clarify whether
courts should hold the supervisory attorney strictly liable for conduct of
supervised attorneys, leaving open the question of whether a plaintiff
seeking to hold a supervising attorney personally liable must establish some
negligence on the part of the supervising attorney.' Other statutes require
a showing of partner negligence or fault, specifying the types of activities
that could trigger negligence liability, including supervision and coopera-
tion.0 Statutory language also raises questions on the level of "supervi-
sion" that gives rise to liability.' As discussed below, these ambiguities
may encourage attorneys to avoid any connection to other attorneys' work.
IV. Internal Consequences of Converting to Limited Liability Firms
Traditionally, law firms functioned as general partnerships in which the
partnership and its partners were liable for tortious wrongs or contractual
breaches committed by one of its members within the scope or apparent
scope of the partnership. 67 The members shared unlimited liability for firm
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26(c) (McKinney Supp. 1997) (providing that
partner in registered limited liability partnership "shall be personally and fully liable and
accountable for any negligent or wrongful act or misconduct committed by him or her or by
any person under his or her direct supervision and control while rendering professional
services on behalf of such registered limited liability partnership").
64. See Johnson, supra note 42, at 113.
65. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 31, § 3.04(a), at 86.
66. Martin, supra note 26, at 122.
67. See RONALD E. MA.EN & JEFFREY M. SMrTH, LEGAL MALPRACTCE § 5.3 (4th ed.
1996) (referring to Uniform Partnership Act (U.L.A. 1914) Sections 13 and 15 and the Uni-
form Partnership Act (U.L.A. 1992) Sections 305 and 306). Section 79 in chapter four of the
proposed Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers being considered by the American Law
Institute (ALl) recognizes this general rule of vicarious liability in stating: "Each of the
principals of a law firm organized as a general partnership is liable jointly and severally with
the firm." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 79(2) (Tentative Draft
No. 12, 1996). Comment (b) following Section 79 explains the rationale for imposing
vicarious liability:
Vicarious liability also helps to maintain the quality of legal services, by requiring
not only a firm but also its principals to stand behind the performance of other firm
personnel. Because many law firms are thinly capitalized, the vicarious liability
of principals helps to assure compensation to those who may have claims against
the principals of the firm.
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debts. This personal liability of members for firm debts provided a basis
for various provisions in partnership statutes. 8 Thus, by eliminating
unlimited liability, LLP and LLC legislation alters a fundamental premise
underlying traditional partnership practice. This change affects a number
of aspects of law firm practice, including the manner in which attorneys
conduct themselves before and after malpractice claims arise.
A. Adverse Effect on Attorneys' Willingness to Work with and
Supervise Other Firm Attorneys and Employees
Partners in general partnerships pool net cash flows and liability, thus
sharing the costs and benefits of the partnership. In traditional partner-
ships, the unlimited liability shared by partners encourages the partners to
participate actively in firn affairs in an effort to control their own personal
liability exposure. Active participation takes a number of forms, including
acting as supervising attorneys or serving on various committees, such as
opinion review or peer review committees.69 Such monitoring and consulta-
tion promises "[to] improve the quality of services delivered, [to] control
liability losses, and [to] enhance the human capital of the partners."70 Such
measures protect the individual partners, the firm, firm clients, and other
third parties7' who deal with firm attorneys or rely on attorneys' work.'
Id. § 79 cmt. b. To address legislation allowing attorneys to limit their vicarious liability, the
comments note that "limited liability is a principle generally accepted for those engaged in
gainful occupations, and it may be difficult for a lawyer to monitor the behavior of other
lawyers in a large firm." Id. The ALI membership declined to approve an earlier version of
Section 79 and accompanying comments that recognized a uniform rule holding attorneys
vicariously liable: "The ALI has not yet resolved what stand the Restatement will take on this
issue...." LimitedLiability Firms, LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) § 91:365
(1996).
68. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 31, § 1.03(c), at 18-19. A number of statutory
provisions "are designed to accommodate the interest of personally liable members who need
to control their potential liability, and whose shares in the firm should reflect their contribu-
tions of personal assets or credit." Id. For example, general partnership statutes provide for
equal and direct participation in management, subject to contrary agreement.
69. Some consultation and involvement with other attorneys occurs on a formal basis,
such as team work on a project or referral of legal problems to other attorneys. Consultation
also occurs on an informal basis, such as sharing ideas and suggestions in a lunch visit or a
section meeting.
70. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26
J.L. & ECON. 327, 335 (1983) (noting that professional services can only be efficiently moni-
tored by other professionals).
71. Third parties who are protected include opposing parties in litigation and investors
who rely on an opinion letter issued by the firm. According to the ABA's National Data
Center statistics, 13% of all malpractice plaintiffs fall into the category of nonclients.
MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 67, § 6.2. As firms grow, the percentage of nonclient claims
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Conversion to a limited liability firm effectively undermines this incen-
tive for principals to consult, monitor, and supervise one another. By
eliminating the risk of personal liability, the limited liability scheme largely
removes a significant economic incentive to monitor the conduct of other
firm participants.73 In the absence of personal liability, firm principals
might still monitor subordinates if they recognized their ethical responsibil-
ity to do so.74 The threat to firm reputation, insurance, and other assets
might also encourage attorneys to monitor other firm players and to partici-
pate in risk management activities. Unfortunately, the limited liability
scheme could undermine this desire to consult with or to monitor other
attorneys because such involvement with other attorneys can destroy the
liability shield. Even defenders of limited liability firms recognize these
"perverse incentive effects."75  As explained by Professors Alan R.
Bromberg and Larry Ribstein:
Partners may find that they can best reduce their risk of personal liability
if they avoid monitoring that might trigger liability for participating in
misconduct. The partner's personal liability for participating in miscon-
duct would exceed their partner's share of the firm's liability. For
example, specialists may refuse to learn about cases in which they are not
directly involved, and firms may abolish opinion committees. This may
hurt both firms and their clients.76
increases. Id. The number of nonclient claims will continue to increase as duties to third
parties expand. For an analysis of the current issues related to injuries to nonclients, see
generally Symposium, The Lawyers' Duties and Liabilities to Third Parties, 37 S. Tx. L.
Rnv. 957 (1996).
72. In traditional partnerships, quality control measures such as peer review measures
provide internal controls on attorney misconduct, whereas unlimited liability exposure acts as
an external control. For a discussion of the effects of culture and organizational structure on
these internal and external controls, see Susan Saab Fortney, Am I My Partner's Keeper? Peer
Review in Law Firms, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 329, 340-344 (1995).
73. See Robert B. Thompson, The Taming of Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO.
L. REy. 921, 942-43 (1995) (warning that "limited liability can have a perverse impact on
sharing work within a firm and on the finn's incentive structure" causing "members [to] dodge
high risk transactions or demand higher compensation").
74. The ABA ethics opinion on practice in limited liability firms expressly states that the
statutory shield from tort liability does not "free attorneys from supervisory obligations" under
applicable ethical rules. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 96-401 (1996).
75. BROMBERG & RSTErN, supra note 31, § 3.04(b), at 88. Different approaches could
be used to address these problems. For example, firms could impose specific duties on
partners or courts could apply some fiduciary duty. Id. (cross-referencing Section 4.04(b) on
indemnification and Section 4.05 on fiduciary duties). For a discussion of indemnification
problems, see infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
76. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 31, § 3.04(b), at 88.
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In short, limited liability provisions not only remove one incentive to
monitor and consult with other attorneys, but the provisions also threaten
to penalize an attorney for doing so. This may cause firm attorneys to
operate more as a confederation of attorneys sharing office space, rather
than as a team sharing responsibilities and work.
Legislation, such as LLP provisions that impose supervisory liability,
might actually subvert firm structure, growth, and cohesion. As discussed
above, most of the LLP statutes make LLP partners "liable not only for
their own misconduct, but also for the conduct of others in which they
somehow participated or for whom they had some monitoring responsibil-
ity."I These provisions could result in a "kind of vicarious liability that is
concentrated on particular partners""8 leaving those partners "more exposed
to liabilities in LLPs than in non-LLP partnerships because only their
assets, and not those of [all] other partners, will be available to pay
claim[s]. '7  Recognizing this exposure, partners may shirk supervisory
responsibilities rather than subject themselves to the risk of personal liabil-
ity for the acts or the omissions of others."0
The ambiguity of the "supervision and control" provisions further
exacerbates their adverse effect.81 The failure of LLP statutory provisions
77. Larry E. Ribstein, Possible Futures of Unincorporated Firms, 64 U. CIN. L. REV.
319, 322 (1996).
78. Id. at 330. Professor Larry E. Ribstein suggests that concentrating tort liability
on supervising or monitoring partners, rather than "across the board" liability, can be justi-
fied on the basis that such partners' connection to the matter might enable them to prevent
the harm or misconduct. Id. at 330-31.
79. Id. at 330 (explaining that this adverse effect "is exacerbated by the fact that
supervisory liability is a wrong that claimants can pursue directly against partners even in
states that otherwise require plaintiffs with vicarious liability claims first to exhaust partner-
ship assets before seeking recovery out of partners' personal assets"). Malpractice experts
Ronald E. Mallen and Jeffrey M. Smith made the same cautionary observation in warning
that limited liability structures for those who do not supervise or render any service leave
those who do even more exposed than in a general partnership. MALLEN & SMITH, supra
note 67, § 5.6.
80. In testimony on the original Texas LLP bill, Professor Bromberg indicated that
unlike the current law, which encourages supervision, the proposed LLP legislation, which
did not include provisions on supervisory liability, would weaken the motivation to supervise
associates and staff closely. See Borges, supra note 15, at 7. Thereafter, Professor Brom-
berg revised the bill to include the provisions for "supervisory and control" liability." See
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 31, § 1.01(a), at 3.
81. In discussing interpretation problems, Professor Hamilton notes that the shield may
easily be described in "abstract terms," but "serious issues of interpretation arise at the
margin." Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1081. Professor Hamilton uses the Texas statute to
illustrate the interpretation problems. Id. at 1081-83. Unlike the District of Columbia
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to define the meaning of "direct supervision or direction" raises a number
of questions, including:
How close does supervision have to be to constitute "direct" supervision?
Does it cover the ultimate responsibility that a senior partner or rain-
maker in a law firm has for "his" client? Is it limited to the mid-level
partner who actually does the work or who supervises associates and
more junior partners when they do the work? Does it extend to members
of the opinion committee of a law firm who review all formal legal
opinions before they are released? I
Although the statutes themselves may not clarify the degree of control
that will subject a supervisor or a monitor to personal liability, commenta-
tors suggest that the statutes should not be interpreted "to deny the liability
shield to someone (such as a managing partner or senior partner) who
exercises indirect supervision over all partnership activities or over a
particular segment of the partnership's business or who generally directs
other partners by establishing policies and procedures or by assigning
responsibilities."I Professor Bromberg's comments following the Texas
LLP statutory provision make a similar observation in stating that:
Mhe supervision probably should be fairly specific for the exception to
apply. The language does not seem intended to deny the liability shield
to someone (such as a managing or senior partner) who exercises only a
general supervision over all partnership activity.'4
Another comment following the Texas LLP provisions states that
questions of supervisory control liability "involve fact questions as well as
statute, which imposes liability on partners who had "written notice or knowledge" of
negligence or malpractice, the Texas statute extends liability to partners who were aware of
negligence or malpractice and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent its occurrence. Id.
at 1081 n.45. The Texas statute does not provide guidance on what charges partners with
notice. Id.
82. Id. at 1082. Following this list of questions that apply to law firms, Professor
Hamilton poses similar questions for accounting firms. See id.
83. R. Dennis Anderson et al., Registered LLPs, 55 TEX. B.J. 728, 729 (1992)
(interpreting Texas LLP provision, which subjects partners to liability when other person
works "under the supervision or direction of the first partner at the time the errors, omis-
sions, negligence, incompetence or malfeasance occurred"); see also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 6132b (West Supp. 1997); Keatinge & Coleman, supra note 10, at 27 (expressing
"hope" that "liability will be limited to those who have exercised negligent supervision,
which is probably direct personal liability for negligence, in any case, rather than personal
liability assigned to someone who happens to hold the title of manager or practice group
leader").
84. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15 cmt., at 112 (West Supp. 1997)
(source and comments about 1991 Amendments by Alan R. Bromberg).
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interpretation of the statutory language. "I Malpractice plaintiffs' attorneys
will attempt to assert claims to raise fact questions on the responsibility of
all firm attorneys who had any connection to the matter giving rise to the
malpractice claim.' These fact questions eventually will be litigated when
plaintiffs assert that partners should be held liable for serving as monitors,
managers, or supervisors.'
Several statutes that provide for some form of supervisor or control
liability do not clarify whether negligence on the part of the supervisor must
be established.88 If liability can be imposed on a supervisor, manager, or
control person without establishing negligence, then liability appears to be
a kind of strict liability imposed for serving in a role as a supervisor,
monitor, or manager.89
Because the statutes leave open many questions relating to supervisory
and control liability, risk-averse attorneys' will probably elect to do less
85. Id.
86. When questions of interpretation arise, Professors Bromberg and Ribstein caution
that "under pressure from plaintiffs' lawyers, courts might expand partners' individual
liability for their own misconduct to compensate in part for the elimination of vicarious
liability, perhaps by imposing liability on partners who are not involved in the misconduct
but who merely learn of it and fail to act on this knowledge." BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN,
supra note 31, § 3.04(b), at 88.
87. In his comments that follow Texas LLP statutory provisions, Professor Bromberg
apparently recognizes the inevitability of resolving the fact questions in litigation when
stating that a "firm which has well defined lines and descriptions of responsibility may have
an advantage when issues of this sort are litigated." Id. In litigation, plaintiffs may seek
to name all partners on the theory that the applicable ethical rules require that all members
of a firm take steps to insure adequately that all lawyers in a firm comply with requirements
of the rules of professional conduct. See Anthony E. Davis, Limited Liability for Lawyers,
PROF. LAW., Aug. 1995, at 1, 5 (referring to obligations under Model Rule 5.1, with
respect to supervising other lawyers, and Model Rule 5.3, with respect to supervising
nonlawyer employees). For a discussion of Model Rule 5.1 and a partner's duty to monitor
his or her peers, see Fortney, supra note 72, at 354-57.
88. Proponents of limited liability firms urge that liability only be imposed on a
showing of negligent supervision. See Keatinge & Coleman, supra note 10, at 27.
89. See Ribstein, supra note 77, at 331 (warning that partners "may refuse to engage
in strict liability activities where this will cause them to bear all of the risk, but reap only
some of the gain").
90. In many ways, risk-averse partners tend to be superior monitors and supervisors
as compared to other partners who tend to be less concerned about liability exposure.
Ironically, the persons that will serve as the better monitors and supervisors will probably
try to evade any supervisory or monitoring responsibility. In addition, persons with limited
nonexempt assets may be less effective monitors than partners with substantial assets at
stake. Partners with limited or no personal assets at stake may be willing to accept supervi-
sory or monitoring positions, especially if they receive additional compensation for doing
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rather than more and to know less rather than more when it comes to
working with peers and subordinates. 91 Similarly, wealthy senior attorneys
might avoid acting as monitors, mentors, managers, and supervisors simply
because those roles could subject them to personal liability for others' acts
or omissions. The reluctance of experienced attorneys to train and super-
vise associates and junior partners can adversely affect the quality of legal
services and may hamper the subordinates' professional growth and under-
mine their loyalty to the firm. 2 Finally, attorneys who fear personal
liability for the work of others may be less inclined to refer work to other
firm attorneys, resulting in a kind of "territorial" hoarding of work by
attorneys who may not be the best qualified to handle the work. Once
again, this undermines the functioning of a firm as a team of attorneys
sharing work and consulting each other in the delivery of legal services.
B. Conflicts Relating to Sharing of Liability and Payment of Debts
A traditional partnership could be viewed as a joint enterprise in which
partners share the risks and benefits of that enterprise. This unlimited
liability provides an impetus for partners to stand behind any partner sued
for professional malpractice. 93 Statutory and contractual indemnification
and contribution provisions reflect this "all for one, one for all" relationship
among partners who share unlimited liability for partnership debts. 4 The
elimination of this unlimited liability can lead to conflicts relating to the
payment of malpractice claims and partnership debts, as well as conflicts
related to indemnification and contribution.
so. Because these persons have comparatively less at stake, they may permit risky ventures
that other partners might prevent.
91. See Deborah A. DeMott, Our Partners' Keepers? Agency Dimensions of Partner-
ship Relationships, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 128 (Spring 1995) (explaining that
structure of limited liability statutes creates incentive to know less rather than more about
fellow professionals' activities within same firm).
92. For a thorough analysis of the importance of supervision and mentoring of sub-
ordinate attorneys in law firms, see generally Irwin D. Miller, Preventing Misconduct by
Promoting the Ethics of Attorneys' Supervisory Duties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 259, 267-
74 (1994). As noted, "ongoing supervision prevents mishaps before they occur and allows
opportunities for rectifying any potential problems at early correctable stages." Id. at 272.
93. See Weidlich, supra note 5, at 1 (referring to concern that limited liability rule will
adversely affect firm culture so that partners will not "draw their wagons around colleague
who's been accused of wrongdoing").
94. If partners give up the right to seek indemnification from other partners, they
could be "exchanging the relationship of 'all for one' for one characterized as 'every man
for himself.'" Robert R. Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Partnerships: The Next Step in
the Evolution of the Unincorporated Business Organization, 51 Bus. LAW. 147, 188 (1995).
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When faced with malpractice claims, partners in traditional partner-
ships, understanding their own personal exposure to liability for any judg-
ment, rally around colleagues accused of malpractice. 5 In limited liability
firms, partners may still support colleagues accused of malpractice, under-
standing that the firm's assets and reputation are at stake. In the event that
malpractice insurance covers the loss, no conflict should arise among the
principals. This situation changes, however, when insurance falls short of
the amount of the malpractice claim. Serious conflicts can arise between
firm attorneys with personal liability for the malpractice claim and the
remaining attorneys with no personal liability for the malpractice claim.
When firm assets cannot pay all firm obligations, attorneys with personal
liability for the malpractice claim would probably prefer that the firm use
those assets to pay the malpractice claim. On the other hand, attorneys
with no personal liability for malpractice claims would want firm assets
used to pay general firm debts, such as lease obligations and line of credit
commitments. I This conflict can arise in states in which the LLP statute
only limits liability for tort claims.' A similar conflict could arise if
contractual creditors dealing with limited liability firms require all firm
principals to sign personal guarantees making all principals liable for the
partnership's contractual debt. Principals who foresee these potential
conflicts could attempt to address the conflicts in their partnership agree-
ment or LLC operating agreement. Despite the terms of agreements gov-
erning LLP partners or LLC members, disgruntled partners or members
95. In studying the advisability of converting to an LLP, the LLP evaluation committee
for the Houston-based firm of Vinson & Elkins "concerned itself primarily with the larger
policy implications . . . [of converting to a limited liability] system that would not require
partners to rally around a colleague facing personal liability." Isom-Rodriquez, supra note 8,
at 32 (quoting Vinson & Elkins LLP evaluation committee chairperson).
96. See Robert R. Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Companies and Limited Liability
Partnerships, in 1995 LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS:
OPERATIONS AND DRAFTING AFTER REV. PROC. 95-10, at 1, 122 (1995) (explaining that use
of firm assets to pay general firm debts can force negligent partner to use separate assets to
pay malpractice liability).
97. Under LLP provisions that only extend the liability shield to malpractice claims,
partners not involved in the malpractice would prefer that partnership assets be used to satisfy
ordinary business obligations because they can be compelled to contribute to satisfy such
obligations. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1079-80. For a discussion and examples of the
"opportunistic conduct" that can occur in LLPs between "innocent" partners with no personal
liability for malpractice claims and "guilty" partners with personal liability for both their
malpractice claim and ordinary partnership obligations, see id. As explained by Professor
Hamilton, "principles of fraudulent transfer, preferences in bankruptcy, or breach of fiduciary
duty may come into play to limit opportunistic conduct" by partners with different agendas.
Id. at 1079, n.37.
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could challenge any decision on the use of assets as a breach of fiduciary
duty.98
Partners may not recognize that conversion to limited liability structure
requires reconsideration of indemnification and contribution provisions in
their partnership agreements. 99 First, partnerships must alter the indemnifi-
cation and contribution provisions included in the partnership agreement.
If partners fail to modify their agreements, a negligent partner who pays a
malpractice claim might seek indemnification from the partnership and
contribution from other firm partners. If firm partners refuse to contribute
to the loss, litigation will probably ensue.
When LLP agreements or LLC operating agreements fail to address
indemnification and contribution, the default rules under the Uniform
Partnership Act (UPA) and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA)
provide for indemnification and contribution."° In that event, the same
conflict could occur between the negligent attorney who seeks indemnifica-
tion and contribution and the other partners. Once again, the other partners
may refuse payment, arguing that requiring contribution amounts to a "back
door" imposition of vicarious liability." 1
98. See Robert R. Keatinge, Liability of Members, PLANNING AND USING LIMITED
LIABILITY VEHICLES: LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES,
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED LIABILITY LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, Q243 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
125, 136 (1996) (noting that question of whether application of assets "would implicate a
breach of fiduciary duty to the negligent partner remains to be determined").
99. Keatinge et al., supra note 94, at 195 (suggesting that indemnification provisions be
revised to provide that partnership, rather than individual partners, will indemnify negligent
or responsible partner). Any provision giving rise to an individual obligation to contribute to
the partnership for partnership obligations should also be modified or eliminated. See
Elizabeth G. Hester, Keeping Liability at Bay, Bus. L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 59, 60
(explaining that modification of contribution and indemnification provisions will "assure that
the agreement does not override the protection afforded partners by the [applicable] statute").
100. Section 18(b) of the UPA states: "The partnership must indemnify every partner in
respect of payments made and personal liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the ordinary
and proper conduct of its business, or for the preservation of its business or property." UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT (1914) (UPA) § 18(b), 6A U.L.A. 526 (1995). Section 401(c) of RUPA
states: "A partnership shall reimburse a partner for payments made and indemnify a partner
for liabilities incurred by the partner in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership
or for the preservation of its business or property." REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (1994)
(RUPA) § 401(c), 6A U.L.A. 52 (1995).
101. The application of the indemnification and contribution rules could be viewed as a
dilution of LLP protection. Professors Bromberg and Ribstein explained this dilution as
follows: "If a partner is liable for her own misconduct and receives indemnification from the
firm, the other partners have in effect shared that liability. Similarly, if innocent partners are
required to contribute to losses resulting from another partner's misconduct, they are effec-
tively sharing that liability." BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 31, § 2.08(a), at 61.
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Limited liability statutes can address the contribution problem by
limiting the obligation of an LLP partner to contribute to the losses of the
partnership, to indemnify other partners, and to make contributions upon
dissolution." When a limited liability statute does not address contribution
and indemnification rights, partners will be left to litigate the question. 3
Although partners may want to eliminate "across-the-board" indemnifi-
cation and contribution, in some areas they may determine that indemnifica-
tion and contribution should be provided in order for partners to assume
special risks liability."°  For example, supervisors, managers, practice
leaders, and oversight committee members may require indemnification
before serving in positions that could subject them to personal liability for
the acts and the omissions of others.1°5 Because partners in these positions
in limited liability firms face more exposure than they would in traditional
partnerships,"°s denying indemnification to them may cause them "to be
reluctant to engage in these activities, [or they] may seek alternative types
of compensation so that they can, in effect, insure against the risk, or [they]
may refuse to be partners in LLPs.' ' 0
102. See Louis A. Mezzullo, Choice of Entity, QUALIFIED PLANS, PCs, AND WELFARE
BENEFITS, 980 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1121, 1183-1185 (1995) (reviewing different LLP provisions
dealing with indemnification and contribution). Most LLP statutes have adjusted the UPA
indemnification and contribution provisions, and the prototype LLP statute adjusted the
RUPA indemnification and contribution provision. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note
31, § 2.08(a), at 61 n.195.
103. In the event of litigation, the court should construe the indemnification and
contri'ution sections "consistently with the limitation of liability." Id. Allowing negligent
partners to recover, directly or indirectly, from other partners would appear to be inconsis-
tent with the LLP liability shield. Anderson et al., supra note 83, at 733.
104. See Ribstein, supra note 77, at 329 (explaining that partners involved in "high-risk
activities may demand indemnification from the partnership as a condition of participating
in an LLP rather than having to face these liabilities alone"). A New York attorney who
participated in the drafting of the New York LLP statute indicated that agreements from
partners to contribute to partners handling certain transactions could avoid intrafirm
squabbles, while maintaining the tradition of supporting one's partners. Edward A. Adams,
Firms Expected to Make Switch to New Format: Limited Liability Partnerships Seen Restrict-
ing Exposure, N.Y. L.J., July 14, 1994, at 1.
105. See Davis, supra note 87, at 6 (describing opinion letter committee members and
"rainmakers" as persons who might insist on indemnification).
106. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
107. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 31, § 2.09(d), at 66-67. In another article,
Professor Larry Ribstein identified problems associated with these additional contracting
costs. For example, increasing supervisors' compensation to reflect their "extra litigation
risk" may "compromise other objectives in designing partner compensation." Ribstein,
supra note 77, at 331.
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This contractual indemnification also subjects the indemnified partners
and the other partners to different risks. First, indemnification means that
partners to be indemnified "rather than tort creditors would be left with the
risk that assets of [other] partners would be inadequate or unavailable to
pay claims."1 8 The partner to be indemnified could resort to litigation to
recover funds from the other partners. The other partners would carefully
scrutinize their agreement to confirm that the indemnification provisions
would not cover serious misconduct by the partner seeking indemnifica-
tion." 9 Finally, the indemnification provisions would need to be qualified
so as to avoid triggering an obligation to outside creditors." 0
These problems relating to the sharing of liability and payment of
claims could be avoided if firms' malpractice insurance policies would pay
all costs related to the defense and payment of malpractice claims. Unfor-
tunately, the limited liability structure creates potential conflicts among the
partners related to insurance acquisition and use. These conflicts may
adversely affect the costs and availability of malpractice insurance coverage.
C. Adverse Effects on the Cost and Availability
of Malpractice Insurance
Attorneys may not realize that converting to limited liability structure
impacts different aspects of professional liability insurance, starting with the
annual decision to secure malpractice coverage. First, attorneys may
mistakenly think that conversion to a limited liability firm diminishes the
need for professional liability insurance."' Even attorneys who understand
that malpractice insurance should be purchased to protect firm assets (and
the assets of the persons accused of malpractice) may elect policies with
lower limits of liability than they would want in a traditional firm in which
partners share unlimited personal liability. In determining the amount of
coverage, attorneys involved in activities that pose higher risk of personal
liability, such as securities attorneys and section supervisors, may prefer
higher limits of liability than less exposed attorneys."'
108. Ribstein, supra note 77, at 331.
109. BROMBERG & RmSTEiN, supra note 31, § 2.09(d), at 67.
110. Id.
111. See Kirsten L. Christophe, Continuing Protection: Converting to a Limited Lia-
bility Structure Raises Key Insurance Issues, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at 92 (referring to this
belief as "common misperception").
112. Ribstein, supra note 77, at 332 (explaining that attorneys exposed to higher levels
of risk "may insist on maintaining higher levels of insurance or on [the firm] retaining more
cash than the less exposed partners would prefer"). To illustrate the conflict between these
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Assuming that the firm resolves conflicts on purchasing the policy, the
limited liability structure can cause insurance conflicts after a person makes
a malpractice claim. Facing a malpractice claim, partners in traditional
firms circle the wagons and marshal a unified defense."' This generally
enables the firm and the target attorneys to hire the same defense counsel
because their interests are aligned.1 14 As a result, partners in traditional
partnerships seldom file cross claims against one another.1 The limited
liability structure changes the alignment of the partners so that "liability of
one" no longer amounts to "liability for all.""' 6 In a limited liability firm,
partners sit in different positions. Those partners involved in client repre-
sentation risk personal liability while the statutory limited liability provi-
sions protect other partners if the court upholds the liability shield. 17 Even
partners with personal liability exposure can be divided.
two groups of partners, Professor Hamilton used the example of a two-partner firm in which
one partner practices in the area of trusts and estates and the other partner handles mergers
and acquisitions. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1084.
113. Although "[i]t of en is desirable to present a united front against a professional
liability claim through a common defense on behalf of the firm and all its partners," some
observers theorize that the limited liability shield may divide partners. See Christophe,
supra note 111, at 92.
114. Professional liability policies name the firm as the insured and extend coverage to
all professionals and employees associated with the firm. Debra A. Winiarski, Walking the
Fine Line: A Defense Counsel's Perspective, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 596, 607 (1993).
Typically, the insurer will hire the same defense attorney to represent the firm and firm
attorneys named as codefendants. Id. at 607-08 (describing conflicts analysis that defense
counsel complete before accepting joint representation of codefendants).
115. The filing of cross claims would serve no purpose because current partners in
traditional partnerships will be held liable for all partnership debts and obligations. See
RUPA § 306(a) (providing that "all partners are liable jointly and severally for all obliga-
tions of the partnership unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law").
116. See John J. Soughan, Professional Responsibility and Law Firm Management:
Issues from an Insurer's Point of View 10 (1996) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review) (noting that traditionally liability for one is, in a sense,
liability for all resulting in "uniformity of interest as between partners and even extended
to the firm and the carrier").
117. The courts may not recognize the liability shield for a number of reasons. For
example, some statutes, such as the Texas LLP statute, require the registered LLP to
maintain "at least $100,000 of liability insurance of the kind that is designed to cover the
kinds of errors [and] omissions ... for which liability is limited" under the statute. TEX.
Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1997). Depending on the
circumstances, a court may need to construe and apply this language to determine if the
liability shield applies. To illustrate the construction problems, Professor Hamilton poses a
number of questions including the following:
[W]hat happens if an act of negligence or malpractice is covered.., under the
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Consider the example of a malpractice claim arising out of a tax shelter
opinion which failed to disclose that a tax attorney with the firm would earn
commissions on the cash proceeds generated by tax shelter sales."' In that
event, the tax attorney and the members of the committee who approved the
opinion could share personal liability. The committee members might file
cross claims against the tax attorney, asserting that the tax attorney failed
to inform them of the tax attorney's contingent interest. Because the
positions of the committee members and the tax attorney clearly conflict,
the individual attorneys and the firm should not be represented by the same
defense counsel." 9 Rather, committee members would probably demand
statutes but is excluded from coverage by a restriction or exception in the liability
insurance policy? Since the insurance proceeds are not available to the plaintiff
in that case, may she ignore the shield of limited liability and go after the
innocent partners? The language, "of a kind that is designed to cover the kinds
of negligence, wrongful acts, and misconduct for which liability is limited" indi-
cates that a complete overlap between coverage and the shield of limited liability
is not required, but no one really knows.
Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1083. As indicated, questions may arise as to whether the
firm's insurance policy satisfies the statutory requirements. If the policy does not, the court
could deny the liability shield, sorely disappointing attorneys who relied on such a shield.
118. Because investors could view the pecuniary interest as a material fact reflecting
on the firm's independence, the opinion letter should have disclosed the commission arrange-
ment. See John P. Freeman, Current Trends in Legal Opinion Liability, 1989 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 235, 275-76 (recommending disclosure of any personal interest which reasonable
person would consider important in subject matter of opinion).
119. The interests of the committee members and the tax attorney not only conflict on
defense of the claim, they also could conflict because of the application of one or more
insurance policy exclusions. For example, the fraud exclusion under the policy could apply
if the plaintiff established that the tax attorney defrauded the plaintiff in not disclosing the
bankruptcy. If the committee members did not engage in the fraud, they could be protected
under the "innocent partner" provision typically found in legal malpractice policies. The
innocent partner protection extends coverage to any insured who neither personally partici-
pated in fraudulent, criminal, or dishonest conduct nor remained passive after learning of
any such act or omission. Robert W. Minto, Jr. & Marcia D. Morton, The Anatomy of
Legal Malpractice Insurance: A Comparative View, 64 N.D. L. REV. 547, 573-74 (1988).
If a policy does not provide innocent partner protection, the fraud exclusion may eliminate
coverage for all partners even if the plaintiff alleges that certain partners acted negligently
in failing to supervise and mitigate their partners' criminal acts. See Continental Cas. Co.
v. H.S.I. Fin. Servs., Inc., 466 S.E.2d 4, 6 (Ga. 1996) (concluding that claim that law
partners acted negligently in supervising and mitigating fellow partner's criminal act
"'aris[es] out of any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal, or malicious act" within meaning of
insurance policy's fraud exclusion). But see Continental Cas. Co. v. McDowell &
Colantoni, Ltd., 668 N.E.2d 59, 64-65 (ll. App. Ct. 1996) (concluding that "dishonesty"
provision in law firm's professional liability insurance policy did not exclude claim alleging
law firm negligently failed to supervise its trust account and thereby allowed firm member
to misappropriate client funds).
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a separate defense." The multiple defenses would reduce the amount
available to pay the claim because legal malpractice policies now include
the amount of defense costs in. the coverage limits.' Depending on the
size of the claim and the amount of damages sought, the interests of the
insured attorneys might conflict on application of the amount remaining
under the policy. The committee members might want the insurer to use
the remaining amount to fund a settlement for them. At the same time, the
tax attorney could insist that the insurer devote the remaining policy amount
to defense. In the event of such a conflict, an insurance company could
seek court intervention to resolve the dispute. This conflict not only divides
firm attorneys, but reduces the amount of insurance remaining to pay the
plaintiff following judgment or settlement.
These conflicts and other issues associated with the limited liability
structure will force insurers to rethink their approach to underwriting legal
malpractice insurance. Historically, insurers developed attorneys' profes-
sional liability policies for partnerships." Legal malpractice insurance
experts Ronald E. Mallen and Jeffrey M. Smith suggest that different struc-
tures, providing different levels of liability protection to partners, should
affect how insurers rate the risk." Although the limited liability structure
may not change the maximum amount of the insurers' exposure under a
policy, conflicts like those discussed above may cause insurers to spend
more to defend claims. In addition, insurers will increase premiums if their
claims experience indicates that limited liability firms tend to relax internal
controls. As explained by one risk management expert, insurers may
differentiate premiums between firms with and without limited liability
status on the theory that "if their individual assets are not at risk, members
of firms with limited liability will have far weaker incentives than those
retaining joint and several liability to adopt effective risk management
120. As a general rule, insurers that insure "codefendants whose interests conflict must
retain independent counsel for each insured or permit each insured to do so at its expense."
Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle of Insurance Defense Ethics, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETIcs 475, 494 (1996). An attorney who attempts to represent codefendants with
an actual or a potential conflict may violate the applicable disciplinary rules prohibiting such
representation and may be sued for malpractice. Id. at 495.
121. As explained by one legal malpractice insurance expert, mounting separate
defenses may deplete any retention (or deductible) more quickly and may also serve to
reduce amounts available under the insurance policy to pay the actual claim. Soughan,
supra note 116, at 12.
122. Id. at 10.
123. MALLE & SMrrH, supra note 67, § 5.6, at 372 (explaining that insurers continue
to determine insurability according to traditional means on assumption that type of entity
does not affect amount of insurance for entity).
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within their practices."124 In traditional partnerships, the risk of unlimited
liability provides an impetus for all firm partners to support internal con-
trols to prevent malpractice."z If the elimination of unlimited vicarious
liability causes firms to be lax, insurers will adjust their premiums to reflect
their increased exposure."2 As the cost of insurance increases, partners in
limited liability firms may elect to carry lower limits of insurance or the
minimum amount required under some statutes."2 This leads to conflicts
among partners and externalization of costs to aggrieved clients and other
tort victims.
V. External Consequences of Eliminating Vicarious Liability
Attorneys readily acknowledge that their interest in limited liability
firms stems from a desire to limit their vicarious liability without forgoing
taxation as a partnership." If courts recognize the statutory limits on
vicarious tort liability, attorneys will obtain the limited liability protection
they seek. At the same time, members of the legal profession, state legisla-
tures, and the public may not fully appreciate or acknowledge the unfore-
seen consequences of eliminating vicarious liability in limited liability firms.
As discussed above, conversion to limited liability firms can adversely
124. Anthony E. Davis, Limited Liability for Lawyers, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 6, 1995, at 3,
5. In addition to the risk of increased premiums, Mr. Davis describes another risk associ-
ated with the underwriting of limited liability firms that relates to insurers' concerns over
the financial viability of their insureds. Insurers who are concerned that firms will not or
cannot pay the policy deductible may require that firms provide additional information on
their financial condition. Id. Firm partners may not expect such intrusive inquiry into firm
finances.
125. For a discussion of the importance of internal controls in insurers' underwriting
investigations, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, How Firms Avoid Risk, NAT'L L. J., May 9, 1994,
at A21.
126. Limited liability firms could radically change underwriting practices if claims
experience for limited liability firms causes insurers to write malpractice policies for individ-
ual firm attorneys rather than for the entire firm.
127. In recent years, carriers have increased premiums for attorneys' professional liabil-
ity insurance. See Note, Developments in the Law - Lawyers' Responsibilities and Law-
yers' Responses - Lawyers' Responses: Shifting the Costs of Liability, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1651, 1652 (1994). This trend will continue, if not worsen, if carriers learn that the limited
liability structure exposes firms and, correspondingly, the carriers to increased malpractice
exposure. If carriers determine that limited liability firms appear to be too risky, they could
refuse to underwrite them.
128. See Eliminate the Vicarious Professional Liability of Attorneys, CmU. Bus. ASS'N
REC., Sept. 1994, at 24 (recommending that Illinois Supreme Court's rules be amended to
eliminate vicarious liability of attorneys who are co-owners of law firms operating as
professional corporations and limited liability companies).
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affect internal firm affairs. The blanket elimination of vicarious liability
can also adversely affect clients and other persons dealing with firms. The
external consequences of eliminating vicarious liability merit further exami-
nation. This examination of the possible outcomes requires consideration
of the basic tenets underlying vicarious tort liability.
A. Traditional Justifications for Imposing Vicarious Liability
Traditional tort principles and economic theory intersect in their justi-
fications for imposing vicarious liability. Under tort law, vicarious liability
deliberately allocates risk to the principal as a cost of doing business
through agents as a policy rule.129 The principal, rather than the injured
tort victim, stands in the best position to absorb losses, "to distribute them,
through prices, rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift
them to society. '"3' Thus, vicarious liability provides a powerful incentive
for principals to engage in careful selection, instruction and supervision of
personnel, and to take "every precaution" to see that they conduct the
enterprise safely. 3' In short, the traditional justification for vicarious
liability embodies principles of risk allocation and harm avoidance through
deterrence.
B. Economic Justifications for Imposing Liability
1. Deterrence
The principles of risk allocation and deterrence also provide economic
justifications for imposing tort liability.' First; the general deterrence
approach imposes liability in a manner that encourages people to act effi-
ciently and thereby to avoid injury to others.' In the context of accidents,
129. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69,
at 500 (5th ed. 1984) (referring to vicarious liability within context of employers and their
employees engaged in enterprise).
130. Id. § 69, at 500-01.
131. See id. § 69, at 501.
132. As early as 1929, William 0. Douglas planted the seeds for economic analysis of
tort law in an essay using an economic perspective to analyze the doctrine of respondeat
superior. See William 0. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE
L.J. 584, 584-85 (1929). The economic analysis of tort law blossomed in the 1960s and the
1970s with the work of various scholars, most notably Guido Calabresi and Richard A.
Posner.
133. In his seminal work analyzing the economics of accident law, Guido Calabresi
distinguished the "specific deterrence" approach, which seeks collectively to target specific
acts or activities thought to cause accidents, with the "general deterrence" approach, which
decides the costs of activities and lets "the market determine the degree to which, and the
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this general deterrence approach operates to reduce accident costs by
creating incentives to engage in safer activities and thereby reducing acci-
dents."' Using this approach, people are free to choose whether they
would rather engage in certain activities and pay the costs to do so or
engage in safer activities. 5 In making this choice, economists assume that
people act rationally in their own self-interest. As rational actors, individu-
als weigh the costs of harmful conduct against the costs of avoiding the
harm. When the risk of liability causes actors to engage in safer activities,
tort rules effectively deter or discourage dangerous activity.
Some tort scholars question the capacity of law to deter certain types
of torts. 6 With respect to professional malpractice, a 1987 treatise by
William M. Landes and Judge Richard Posner refers to the "widespread
agreement that the imposition of tort liability on professionals ...does
affect behavior, does deter - some think too much!'37 Since that publica-
tion, empirical data suggest that the threat of tort liability discourages
professionals from engaging in tortious conduct. In the context of medical
professionals, studies reveal that the threat of liability clearly affects the
behavior of doctors in encouraging the adoption of risk management pro-
grams, resulting in a reduction in the basic number of malpractice
incidents. 3 8 According to the data obtained in a Harvard study, the rate of
negligent patient injuries in New York hospitals was thirty percent less than
it would have been were there no liability for medical malpractice. 39
ways in which, activities are desired given such costs." GuiDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTs 68-69, 95 (1970).
134. See id. at 73 (explaining that some people who would engage in relatively danger-
ous activities at prices that did not reflect costs, will shift to safer activities if costs are
reflected in prices).
135. See id. at 69. Because of the role the market plays in placing losses on activities
that engender them, Guido Calabresi calls "general deterrence" the market approach. See
id.
136. For an evaluation of the "realistic objections" to the claims about tort law's deter-
rence efficacy, see Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does
Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377, 381-87 (1994).
137. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAw 11 (1987). In this discussion, Professor Landes and Judge Posner acknowledge
that although there had been little "systematic study of the deterrent effect of tort law, what
empirical evidence there is indicates that tort law deters, even where... liability insurance
is widespread." Id. at 10.
138. See Schwartz, supra note 136, at 401-03 (reviewing examples of how threat of
liability has caused medical providers to practice "defensive medicine" and to implement risk
management programs to improve providers' claims experience).
139. Paul Weiler, a member of the Harvard study team, drew this conclusion, extrapo-
lating from the Harvard data. See id. at 404-05.
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Reports relating to New Zealand's experience in abolishing its tort
system and replacing it with a compensation program for all personal
injuries also indicate that tort law provides a significant amount of deter-
rence."4 Reportedly, "informed observers believe that the elimination of
liability has led to laxer standards of medical care."' 4' Even the former
administrator of the New Zealand compensation program acknowledged that
"people fear that there is a lack of any deterrent element.' 42 This informa-
tion suggests that the threat of malpractice claims deters harmful conduct
by encouraging precautions in the delivery of professional services. 43
Within the context of a law firm, the deterrence principle applies to the
conduct of different organizational players. First, the risk of tort liability
should discourage individual attorneys from engaging in tortious activity.
The risk of enterprise liability being imposed on the firm motivates firm
managers to institute malpractice avoidance measures.'" Finally, the risk
of vicarious liability being imposed on all partners in a traditional partner-
ship encourages partners to monitor one another's conduct. 145 In short,
vicarious liability provides an incentive for attorneys to institute malpractice
avoidance measures and to monitor the conduct of their peers.
The elimination of partners' vicarious liability guts the most powerful
incentive for law firm members to invest in monitoring and malpractice
prevention measures. First, members of limited liability law firms may not
concern themselves with the harm to others that would generate liabilities
140. See id. at 420-22. Professor Schwartz distinguishes between "the strong form of
deterrence argument - which assumes that tort law does in fact deter as thoroughly as
economic models suggest - and the more 'moderate' form of the argument - which assumes
that tort law provides a significant amount of deterrence." Id. at 378. Professor Schwartz
concludes that information from New Zealand and other evidence relating to the deterrence
value of tort law supports the moderate form of the deterrence argument, but not the stronger
version. See id. at 423.
141. Id. at 420 (quoting Patricia M. Danzon, Malpractice Liability: Is the Grass on the
Other Side Greener?, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 176, 203 (Peter H. Shuck ed.,
1991)).
142. Id. at 421 (quoting Margaret Vennell, International Workshop, Beyond Compensa-
tion: Dealing with Accidents in the Twenty-First Century, Brief Country Reports: New Zealand,
15 U. HAW. L. REv. 568, 571 (1993)).
143. Increases in the number and success of legal malpractice claims and in the size of
damage awards have compelled "the profession to pay greater attention to ensuring compe-
tence." RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 9 (1989).
144. For example, by imposing sanctions against law firms, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure deters misconduct by encouraging firms to monitor individual attorneys.
See Jeffrey A. Parness, The New Federal Rule 11: Different Sanctions, Second Thoughts, 83
ILL. B.J. 126, 129 (1995).
145. See Fama & Jensen, supra note 70, at 335 (recognizing importance of pooling of net
cash flows and liability in encouraging mutual monitoring and consulting).
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beyond the amount they contributed to the firm. 14 Moreover, limited
liability statutes actually create disincentives to firm members functioning
as a team with firn-wide responsibility for client representation. As sug-
gested above, involvement in a case could result in an attorney losing the
liability shield. Practically speaking, this limited liability regime will cause
attorneys to become more insular in their representation of clients, shunning
supervisory or monitoring responsibilities within the firm. As rational
actors, attorneys will avoid liability by shutting their eyes, intentionally
avoiding involvement in the work of their peers and associates. Supporters
of LLP and LLC legislation advocate the limited liability rule, referring to
the difficulty of monitoring in large law firms. Basically, they assert that
unlimited liability should be eliminated because size makes monitoring
difficult in large firms. 147 This argument ignores the deterrent effect of
unlimited liability in encouraging firms to implement safety precautions and
risk management measures, such as opinion review committees."4 The
argument assumes that monitoring requires second-guessing and direct
involvement in other attorneys' work. This argument also assumes that all
law firms are large and that size excuses the implementation of monitoring
and safety measures."' As explained by one commentator: "[S]trong evi-
146. See Robert B. Thompson, Unpacding Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability
of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 14 (1994) (assert-
ing that limited liability in corporate enterprise may result in enterprise not sufficiently
investing in safety and overinvesting in hazardous activities, resulting in scenarios in which
"enterprise will not bear all of its costs").
147. See, e.g., Michael J. Lawrence, Note, The Fortified Law Firm: Limited Liability
Business and the Propriety of Law Incorporation, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 207, 211, 222
(1995) (asserting that growth of law firms, with increased specialization, departmentalization,
and branch offices, make monitoring "improbable, if not physically impossible"). One com-
mentator even suggests that monitoring can result in undue interference in professional
relationships between individual attorneys and their clients. See Stephen E. Kalish, Lawyer
Liability and Incorporation of the Law Firm: A Compromise Model Providing Lawyer-Owners
with Limited Liability and Imposing Broad Vicarious Liability on Some Lawyer-Employees, 29
ARIz. L. REv. 563, 572-73 (1987). In responding to this "undue interference" argument, one
author explains "that the legal profession is threatened less by overly-cautious [attorneys] than
by [attorneys] who, not being subject to extensive monitoring by the owners of their firm,
might represent their clients incompetently." Denker, supra note 13, at 366. Recognizing the
difficulties in monitoring, liability rules should encourage, rather than discourage, monitoring.
For a discussion of how the LLP and the LLC statutes discourage monitoring, see supra notes
69-92 and accompanying text.
148. Internal review committees, policies, and procedures help to prevent maverick or
inexperienced attorneys from violating professional standards. See Lawrence G. Baxter,
Reforming Legal Ethics in a Regulated Environment: An Introductory Overview, 8 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 181, 212 (1995).
149. But see Milton R. Wessel, Institutional Responsibility: Professionalism and Ethics,
60 NEB. L. REv. 504, 513 (1981) (asserting that large institutional practice "should not be
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dence indicates that large firms are in fact more able than small firms to co-
monitor ... [and] to shoulder the considerable overhead cost required to
launch and maintain many co-monitoring tools unavailable to smaller
firms."15 Unlike smaller firms, which can more easily rely on informal
controls and face-to-face interaction, larger firms need more bureaucratic
controls, such as firm policy manuals and administrative committees. 5 1
Finally, the assertion that monitoring should be excused in large firms
assumes the value of large law firms compared to smaller firms.152 The
large law firm in which partners share unlimited liability provides "'one
stop' expertise and an internal, bonded referral market."'5 3 From the
client's perspective, the value of one-stop shopping may not be enough to
granted an exemption from responsibility simply because their members are independent
licensed professionals").
150. Murphy, supra note 13, at 221. Comonitoring tools include supervisory personnel
structuring and training programs for all firms attorneys, as well as computer case manage-
ment, file storage, telecommunications, docket control, and conflict control systems. See
id.
151. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Issue of Firm Size, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 24, 1994, at
A21; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Size Creates Tension, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 21, 1994, at
A21 (explaining that elaborate administrative controls, such as conflicts systems, keep large
firms functioning). Administrative committees, calendaring systems, conflicts systems,
supervision arrangements, and other measures that control malpractice are institutional mea-
sures. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RuTGERS
L. REV. 101, 143 (1995) (arguing that vicarious liability ensures that partners will institute
and enforce such measures).
152. As suggested by one critic of limited liability law firms: "Perhaps it is the large
law firm, not co-monitoring, that is 'impractical.' . . . Perhaps the wealth gained from
large law firms' economies of scale, economies of scope, and attorney specialization is
insufficient to protect clients whose lawyers' malpractice injures them beyond the limits of
the firm assets and insurance." Murphy, supra note 13, at 221-22. In bemoaning the
"dramatic increase in the number of malpractice cases and settlement and jury verdicts
against the largest and best known law firms in the country," Robert E. O'Malley, Loss
Prevention Counsel of Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, the insurer of the nation's
largest law firms, explains that "large law firms are the [malpractice] problem these days."
Eighth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 133 F.R.D. 245, 283 (1990). Mr. O'Malley reported that "large, well-known law
firms" paid the four largest settlements of legal malpractice claims in the last five years.
Id. at 283-84. The settlement amounts of $55 million, $40 million, $27 million, and $20
million represented the limits of liability under the applicable malpractice policy in all cases
except one. Id. at 284.
153. Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, The Many Futures of the Big Law Firm, 45 S.C.
L. REV. 905, 909 (1994). "One stop" expertise means that a single entity can assist clients
with multifaceted problems. See id. Firm assets and reputation, coupled with the personal
liability of firm partners, act as a kind of bond insuring the performance of services by firm
attorneys to whom work is referred. See id. at 910.
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justify eliminating the deterrent value of holding attorneys liable for acts or
omissions of other attorneys within the scope of firm business."M As firms
grow, vicarious liability becomes more important because each firm attor-
ney "wields the prestige of the firm" and clients rely on firm reputation. 155
2. Risk Allocation and Externalization Problems
Limited liability defenders tend to discount the importance of firm
attorneys' assuming responsibility for monitoring their peers. With most
clients, such monitoring can only be effectively conducted by other attor-
neys because of the "inherent asymmetry of knowledge about the prod-
uct."'5 6 The disparity in the relative positions of firm attorneys and firm
clients relates to the risk distribution principle. Applying this principle,
liability for loss should be assigned to a party who can prevent loss more
efficiently. In the case of legal malpractice, firm members sit in a better
position than clients and other tort victims to prevent malpractice by firm
attorneys.157 Attorneys can institute various measures such as docket
154. Large law firms may not provide efficiency through the "economies of scale."
Because personnel costs clearly account for the largest firm expenditure, firms do not realize
significant savings as they grow. Moreover, because attorney fees charged by larger firms
tend to be higher than fees charged by smaller firms, nothing indicates that any savings
realized from "economies of scale" results in lower attorney fees.
155. See Leubsdorf, supra note 151, at 142. In explaining the importance of monitor-
ing in large firms, Professor John Dzienkowski notes:
[C]lients of small firms are more likely to seek an individual lawyer in a firm
rather than signing on with the firm itself because of the firm's reputation. In
the large firm, partners are not likely to work with all of the other lawyers on
a regular basis, and are more likely focused on work within their section or
practice or perhaps in one or two related areas of practice. Further, new associ-
ates are more likely to work for a number of partners all of whom may be too
busy to provide proper supervision and guidance.
John S. Dzienkowski, Legal Malpractice and the Multistate Law Firm: Supervision of Multi-
state Offices: Firms as Limited Liability Partnerships; and Predispute Agreements to Arbi-
trate Client Malpractice Claims, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 967, 976-77 (1995).
156. Jack Carr & Frank Mathewson, The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the Legal
Organization of the Firm, 33 J.L. & ECON. 307, 309 (1990) (explaining that in market for
complex professional services, "inherent asymmetry of knowledge" arises because "profes-
sionals supplying the good are knowledgeable [whereas] consumers demanding the good are
uninformed"). Because consumers understand their disadvantage, "they seek assurance from
the market in the form of commitments for honest delivery of services." Id. at 309-10.
157. In addition to clients suing for malpractice, nonclients such as third party benefi-
ciaries and opposing parties in transactions can recover on malpractice claims, such as fraud
claims. These nonclients generally cannot "monitor" the conduct of attorneys who do not
represent them. Nevertheless, they can be hurt by law firm's externalization of costs.
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control and conflict check systems to avoid and detect problems. As
compared to most of their clients and other third parties, firm members'
superior knowledge of procedural and substantive law, coupled with their
access to information, enables them to prevent malpractice more efficiently
than clients. Although some sophisticated clients may be able to monitor
their attorneys, most clients must choose attorneys before they render
services, and "most clients are not repeat players."158
Firm partners stand to benefit from activities of other firm members
and agents. This justifies the imposition of vicarious liability on principals
because principals benefit through their agents' acts and should bear, jointly
and severally with agents, the liability created by agents' misdeeds.159 On
the other hand, a limited liability rule allows firm principals to avoid costs
associated with acts or omissions of other firm actors by allowing the firm
principals to externalize the costs of doing business. If the assets of indi-
vidual tortfeasors and firm assets do not cover the amount of tort claims,
the firm principals shift the cost of doing business to clients and other tort
victims."6 In this sense, tort liability can be viewed as a "cost of the enter-
158. ABEL, supra note 143, at 154 (describing market failure). Abel states: "The only
clients who can effectively police the quality of representation they receive are large
corporations, which increasingly are using in-house counsel to supervise the quality and cost
of services rendered by law firms." Id. at 152. Some sophisticated clients such as clients
represented by corporate counsel might only retain firms who maintain certain levels of
insurance. Less sophisticated clients who do not understand the limited liability structure
of firms will continue to rely on firm reputation. "It is also foolish to believe that the
majority of clients will understand what the designation at the end of the law firm name
means in practice." Dzienkowski, supra note 155, at 985, n.82 (suggesting that state law
require that limited liability firms disclose effect of liability shield on clients' ability to sue
firm principals). In June 1996, I studied business people's perceptions of law firms and law
practice by surveying members of the Austin, Texas Chamber of Commerce. Of the sixty
respondents, 91.27% (fifty-five persons) did not understand the effect of law firms practic-
ing as LLPs or LLCs (study results on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). Business
people who are members of a Chamber of Commerce are presumably more sophisticated
consumers of legal services than members of the general population. This study indicates
that unsophisticated consumers of legal services may continue to rely on firm reputation
because they do not understand the effect of attorneys' practicing in limited liability firms.
159. See DeMott, supra note 91, at 119 (referring to "benefit principle" as one justifica-
tion for imposing vicarious liability on principal for misdeeds of another partner).
160. In some situations, such as cases involving attorney theft or misappropriation of
client funds, the amount of the loss might be shifted to a bar-administered client security
fund., Most client security fund programs restrict the amount of recovery and the conditions
for recovery. In discussing the limitations of such bar-administered programs, Professor
Charles W. Wolfram explains: "Elaborate proof requirements are typically imposed, and all
funds limit, some quite severely, the size of individual claims and the cumulative claims
against any one lawyer that will be compensated." WOLFRAM, supra note 39, § 4.8, at 183.
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prise that limited liability transforms into an externality borne by persons
not associated with it."16' With externalization, "[1]iability that is avoided
does not disappear into a black hole; it falls onto another person."162 In the
case of limited liability law firms, liability falls on the shoulders of tort
victims when firm and tortfeasor assets do not satisfy tort claims. There-
fore, limited liability allows firms to shift to others some of the costs of
economic activity, resulting in economic inefficiency and offending one's
sense of fairness.163
Limited liability creates a moral hazard in allowing participants in
limited liability firms to reap the benefits of risky activities and not bear all
of the costs.1" For example, law firm partners may recruit a rainmaker
who generates risky securities work with millions of dollars of fees for the
firm. Depending on the compensation system the firm uses, firm partners
will share to some degree in the revenue the rainmaker generates. At the
same time, the members of a limited liability firm do not expect to be
personally liable for any claims made in connection with the risky securities
work. Moreover, firm members may intentionally avoid any monitoring
or involvement with the securities attorney, fearing that any connection to
the work will destroy their limited liability shield. Thus, limited liability
encourages excessive risk taking and offsets the economic incentive for
parties to prevent harm to others." As explained below, this results in a
shifting of costs to tort creditors when the assets of the firm and the tortfea-
sor do not satisfy creditors' claims."
161. Phillip I. Blumberg, LimitedLiability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573,
616 (1986).
162. Thompson, supra note 146, at 2.
163. See William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Business Form, Limited Liability, and Tax
Regimes: Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome?, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 1001, 1036 (1995)
(noting that some commentators have defended limited liability by asserting that limited
liability's economic benefits, including encouraging economic investment and growth, out-
weigh its adverse effects). Such justification for limited liability does not apply to limited
liability law firms.
164. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corpora-
tion, 52 U. C-. L. REv. 89, 103-04 (1985) (explaining that critics of limited liability focus
on moral hazard in advocating substantial modification of limited liability doctrine).
165. See David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 CoLuM.
L. REV. 1565, 1586 (1991).
166. For an LLC proponent's response to the general externalization problem, see Larry
E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership, 70 WASH.
U. L.Q. 417, 438-50 (1992).
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This shifting of liability presents a real risk because of the capitaliza-
tion of law firms. 67 Law firms, large and small alike, tend to be thinly
capitalized compared to the amount of firm revenues.' 68 Apart from the
amount of malpractice insurance that firms maintain and the amount of
accounts receivable, law firms normally do not hold significant assets
subject to execution following a judgment. Contract creditors such as
lenders often require a security interest in the accounts receivable and hard
assets.169 In addition, creditors and other sophisticated persons who
contract with limited liability law firms and professional corporations
commonly require that firm members sign personal guarantees. When
faced with tort liability for only some members and contract liability
guaranteed by all members, firm members will probably give priority
to paying the contract creditor. 7 This leaves a tort victim holding a
judgment against a law firm and individual tortfeasors.' 7' To the extent
that the nontortfeasing members made contributions to the firm, they fund
firm liabilities. Members can reduce their expense for tort damages by
minimizing their investment in the firm. In this sense, limited liability
167. An analysis of the impact of a limited liability rule must consider the particular
nature of law firms as a service industry and the capitalization of law firms.
168. See Frederick W. Lambert, An Academic Vt to the Modern Law Firm: Consider-
ing a Theory of Promotion-Driven Growth, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1719, 1728 (1992) ("The law
firm exists as a very thinly capitalized entity that typically renders services for cash that is
due upon presentation of a statement. It distributes profits periodically and generally does
not retain significant earnings. It might accurately be described as a conduit for cash.")
(reviewing MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FiRM (1991)). One commentator predicts that the capitaliza-
tion level of firms will decrease as firms will require less working capital and less long-term
capital. Howard L. Mudrick, Rethinking Capitalization in the 1990s, TEx. LAW., Nov. 9,
1992, at 28, available in LEXIS, News Library, TXLAWR File.
169. Leebron, supra note 165, at 1637 ("Secured creditors who have obtained a valid
lien under state law have priority over unsecured creditors, including tort victims, up to
their security.").
170. Even in the absence of personal guarantees, the same results can occur in states
in which the statutory liability shield only covers malpractice-type claims, rather than all
claims. These statutes give "partners an incentive to protect their own wealth by paying
contract claims first out of partnership assets,jeaving nothing for the tort-type creditors."
BROMBERG & RInsTEIN, supra note 31, § 3.03, at 83. For an analysis for the "opportunistic
conduct" by classes of partners with different financial exposure, see supra notes 95-98 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the fiduciary duty questions raised by the use of
firm assets and distributions to firm attorneys, see Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Preludes:
Likely Issuesfor LLCs, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 1043, 1046-49 (1995).
171. See Burke, supra note 22, at 34 (suggesting that limited liability rule in LLCs may
leave "less powerful" voluntary creditors, such as employees and suppliers, in same position
as involuntary tort creditors).
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actually creates incentives to do business through thinly capitalized
firms. 1
72
Debt financing and the possibility of bankruptcy exacerbate the
"perverse incentives" to externalize costs. 73 When faced with a large
judgment, firm members could vote to dissolve the firm. In bankruptcy,
secured creditors would enjoy absolute priority over tort victims.' 7 4 Thus,
a higher ratio of debt to equity further limits firms' tort liability. Once
the firm files for bankruptcy, partners could simply form a new law firm,
leaving the tort creditor with an uncollectible judgment against the bank-
rupt law firm and the individual tortfeasors. 75
This scenario can be avoided if the principals take steps to maintain
sufficient insurance or assets in order to satisfy malpractice claims.
Unfortunately, the limited liability structure may result in firms carrying
lower levels of insurance than they would carry under an unlimited liabil-
ity regime. Unlimited liability creates strong incentives for firm owners to
purchase insurance sufficient to cover tort judgments because the owners
do not want their personal assets subjected to execution in the event of an
insurance shortfall. In an unlimited liability firm, malpractice insurance
protects attorneys against personal liability for uninsured tort claims and
protects tort victims who have claims covered under the firm's malpractice
policy. The limited liability structure reverses the situation, creating
172. In encouraging attorneys to do business through thinly capitalized firms, the
limited liability rule effectively punishes firms that invest in insurance and malpractice
prevention measures. For an insightful analysis of the consequences of limited liability for
closely held firms, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Share-
holder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1882-94 (1991) (advocating
abandonment of limited liability for corporations).
173. See id. at 1884.
174. See id. (explaining that under prevailing priority rule for distributions of assets in
bankruptcy, tort claimants come after secured creditors and then share pro rata with debtor's
general creditors). In order to minimize the externalities and inefficiencies, Professor David
W. Leebron advocates changing these priorities to give tort claimants priority over both
secured and unsecured financial creditors. Leebron, supra note 165, at 1650. If secured
creditors hold an equity position in the debtor firm, the secured creditors' claims may be
subordinated to other creditors if the debtor firm is undercapitalized. The U.S. Supreme
Court articulated this rule in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307, 323-24
(1939), known familiarly as the "Deep Rock" case because the undercapitalized subsidiary
in the case was named Deep Rock Oil Corporation.
175. A judgment creditor may attempt to hold the new law firm responsible under a
theory of successor liability. In a recent case, the Texas Court of Appeals refused to hold
a limited liability partnership law firm responsible for the tortious acts of the predecessor
law firm. See Medical Designs, Inc. v. Shannon, Gracey, Ratliff & Miller, L.L.P., 922
S.W.2d 626, 628 (Tex. App. 1996, writ denied).
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incentives for owners to purchase either no insurance or the minimum
amount of insurance required by law. Ironically, supporters of limited
liability law firms used the rising costs of malpractice insurance to justify
the elimination of vicarious liability. 76 As discussed above, the limited
liability structure may actually increase the cost of insurance, resulting in
limited liability law firms carrying lower levels of insurance than tradi-
tional law firms would carry."7
A reduction in the amount of malpractice coverage increases the
likelihood that limited liability law firms will not afford compensation for
injuries sustained by conduct of firm attorneys, thus frustrating the com-
pensation purpose of tort law. 78 This compensation principle also justifies
imposition of vicarious liability. Vicarious liability enhances the assets out
of which parties can be compensated.179 On the other hand, limited
liability increases the probability that there will be insufficient assets to
pay creditors' claims.
In analyzing liability controls on corporate malfeasance, Professor
Reinier H. Kraakman argues that asset insufficiency can lead to under-
enforcement of legal norms.' As explained by Professor Kraakman,
176. This justification for limited liability structure indicates that supporters of limited
liability firms believe that statutory liability limits should be provided to attorneys as
protection against personal liability because law firm insiders do not want to pay the higher
costs required to purchase traditional insurance. For a discussion of rising insurance costs
as a force driving the limited liability movement, see Mark Rosencrantz, Comment, You
Wanna Do What? Attorneys Organizing as Limited Liability Partnerships and Companies:
An Economic Analysis, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 349, 371-73 (1996).
177. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 127, at
1673 (discussing insurance as liability-shifting mechanism and concluding that partners may
fail to insure at optimal levels without liability incentive to invest in covering tort risks).
Firms that do not maintain adequate insurance and capital to cover tort claims may face
increases in the cost of credit from voluntary creditors who adjust the cost of credit in
response to the increased risk. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCEEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 107-08 (1991).
178. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 129, at 6 ("The purpose of the law of torts is to
adjust these losses, and to afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the
result of the conduct of another.") (quoting Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of
Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J 238 (1944)); see also CALABRESI, supra note 133, at 27-28
(terming compensation function of accident law as "secondary accident cost reduction goal"
in that "it does not come into play until after earlier primary measures to reduce accident
costs have failed").
179. See DeMott, supra note 91, at 121.
180. In the context of corporate malfeasance, "asset insufficiency" arises when the
"firm's assets cannot cover the tort damages for a firm's delicts." Reinier H. Kraakman,
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J 857, 869
(1984). In the locution of Professor Kraakman, "sanction insufficiency" and "enforcement
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personal liability of firm participants can serve as a "partial check on asset
insufficiency, that is, on the danger that undercapitalized [firms] will
abuse their limited assets to evade the compensatory and deterrent policies
of liability rules.'' 118 Personal liability provides incentives for firm partici-
pants to prod the firm into covering its potential liability."s
In an attempt to deal with the problem of asset insufficiency, some
states require that limited liability firms maintain a minimum amount of
insurance or adequate capitalization. 183 This approach can result in over-
or under-provision for tort risks."S4 Rather than mandating a certain level
of insurance or capitalization, firm attorneys should be allowed to select
the strategy for covering risk through insurance, self-insurance, and
internal risk management activities."S
VI. Alternative Approach to Limited Liability
The previous discussion shows that limited liability firms create a
number of problems, including risk externalization and asset insufficiency.
Nevertheless, attorneys insist that they should not be held jointly and
severally liable for others' acts and omissions. The following proposal
urges a modified approach to limited liability, providing a partial shield
insufficiency" also lead to the underenforcement of legal norms. See id. at 867-68. Sanction
insufficiency occurs when the "legal system cannot charge a price high enough to deter firm
delicts." Id. In the case of attorneys practicing in limited liability firms, sanction insuffi-
ciency arises when monetary sanctions and civil liability imposed against individual attorneys
and their firms does not deter attorney misconduct. Enforcement insufficiency occurs when
"the legal system cannot even detect or prosecute a significant proportion of offenses." Id.
at 868. Given the limitations of the attorney disciplinary systems and other external controls
on attorney conduct, enforcement insufficiency demands enhanced and broader civil liability
for attorney misconduct.
181. Id. at 868-69 (referring to undercapitalized corporations).
182. See id. at 871. In describing statutory insurance requirements as an "unsatisfac-
tory compromise" to deal with externalization problems, Professor Ribstein stated:
Because firms vary widely in size and riskiness, minimum statutory insurance
will be either too much or too little for most firms. Even if legislators could
determine an appropriate minimum amount, they would also have to regulate
such terms as deductibles, exclusions, co-insurance, and the use of proprietary
insurers. In the end, the costs of micromanaging firms' insurance are likely to
exceed the benefits to creditors.
Ribstein, supra note 77, at 333-34.
183. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
184. See Kraakman, supra note 180, at 874.
185. See id. (arguing that managers stand in best position to select "optimal strategy for
covering risk").
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to principals while protecting the consuming public. The proposal creates
incentives designed to encourage malpractice avoidance and to safeguard
against externalization of risk and asset insufficiency. At the same time,
the proposal allows firm principals the freedom to choose how they want
to capitalize, manage, and insure firm risks. The limited liability shield
should apply only if firnm members can show that the firm acted reason-
ably in implementing measures to control the risk that gave rise to liabil-
ity.1  When the amount of malpractice insurance and firm assets do not
adequately cover a malpractice judgment, then the firm members can
avoid personal liability by showing that the firm implemented reasonable
measures and procedures to control the conduct that caused the loss. 117
Therefore, firm members can escape personal liability if they can affirma-
tively show that they acted reasonably in managing risk. 8'
186. C. Kansas Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 94-03 (June 28, 1994), in NATIONAL REPORTER
ON LEGAL ETHICS & PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY KS:OPINIONS:50, KS:OPINIONS:55
(1994) (concluding that Kansas attorneys may practice in LLPs provided that they adhere
to principles of vicarious liability set forth in Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3).
187. The federal securities laws use a similar approach in providing for a due diligence
defense for implementation of compliance programs. For example, Section 20(a) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provides a defense for controlling persons who can
show that they "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action." 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994). As explained in
one commentary:
The essence of this defense is that, notwithstanding the violation, the employer
exercised due care in supervising its employee. To succeed in this defense, the
employer would have to demonstrate that it had an adequate system of supervi-
sion and internal controls in place at the time of the violation, and that it dili-
gently enforced that system.
Lawrence J. Zweifach & Claire R. Telecki, Compliance Procedures: Preventing and
Mitigating Criminal and Civil Liability of Corporate Defendants, in SEcuRrrIES LITIGATION
1993: CURRENT STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPMENTS 209, 216 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 479, 1993). For a recent analysis of the effect of corporate
compliance programs, see Kevin B. Huff, Note, The Role of Corporate Compliance
Programs in Determining Corporate Criminal Liability: A Suggested Approach, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 1252, 1254 (1996) (recommending that evidence of compliance program be
considered with other relevant evidence).
188. This approach is analogous to the concept of "enterprise causation," in which
imposition of liability on the enterprise turns on whether the enterprise could have prevented
wrong. For a discussion of the implications of enterprise causation, see Alan 0. Sykes, The
Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule
and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 571-75 (1988). For example, in a
sexual harassment case, employer's liability could be predicated on the employer's negli-
gence in failing to adopt a policy against harassment. See id. at 604-05 (discussing Meritor
Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71-75 (1986)).
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Using this approach, asset insufficiency creates a presumption of
unlimited liability. Firm members can then plead limited liability as an
affirmative defense and attempt to show that they acted reasonably in
implementing measures and precautions to avoid the problem.189 In the
event that no reasonable precautions could have prevented the loss, firm
members could plead limited liability as an affirmative defense and then
avoid personal liability if they can carry the burden of showing that
implementation of reasonable procedures would not have prevented the
plaintiff's injury. 190
If the firm members do not act reasonably in attempting to control the
risk, they share personal liability if the amount of malpractice insurance
and other firm assets do not satisfy the amount of a tort judgment. 191
Rather than holding firm members personally liable for the amount of the
outstanding judgment, courts should determine each member's share of the
liability on a pro rata basis."9 Using a pro rata approach, a member's
189. Fact questions related to limited liability for members should be resolved by
factfinders in a bifurcated trial. In the first phase of the bifurcated trial, the factflnder deter-
mines whether the plaintiff should recover on the plaintiff's claims. If firm partners plead
limited liability as an affirmative defense, the factfinder in the second phase of the trial
could consider evidence related to law firm implementation of reasonable malpractice pre-
vention controls. The second trial need not be conducted if the amount of the judgment
would be covered by insurance or other firm assets. As in punitive damage cases, in which
the factfinder hears evidence relating to the amount of punitive damages in a separate trial,
the factf'mder would hear in a separate trial evidence related to firm procedures and mal-
practice prevention efforts.
190. Under current statutes, partners can assert the liability shield as an affirmative
defense. For example, to invoke the liability protection under the Texas LLP pro-
vision, partners should plead limited liability as an affirmative defense and then carry
the burden of proving that the partnership qualifies as an LLP, i.e., that it has complied
with the statutory registration, name, and insurance requirements. Thereafter, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that some statutory exception applies, thereby removing the
liability shield. See Anderson et al., supra note 83, at 729.
191. In basing liability on failure to implement measures to control risk, this approach
could be viewed as "modified fault" theory based on a "duty to monitor" one's peers. If
firm members fail to meet that duty, they could be subject to liability for the acts or
omissions of other firm members. For a discussion of law firm partners' duty to monitor,
see Fortney, supra note 72, at 348-61. As attorneys reorganize as limited liability firms,
courts may expand the duty to supervise. See Thompson, supra note 73, at 942.
192. In advocating the abandonment of limited liability for corporate shareholders,
Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman support an alternative approach to
liability in which shareholders share proportionate liability for claims that exceed corporate
assets. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 172, at 1932-33. Under a proportionate
liability rule, if a corporation lacks sufficient assets to satisfy claims, claimants have the
right to recover from each shareholder an amount proportionate to the shareholder's equity
interest in the corporation. See Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited
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individual percentage of the liability will be based on the amount of total
compensation and distributions that each principal received for the last five
years. With this approach, an individual's percentage of responsibility
should correspond to the percentage of total firm remuneration that the
individual received. This approach proportionately places liability on
persons who received remuneration from the firm. To the extent that
distributions prevent firms from retaining earnings and purchasing insur-
ance to respond to liability losses, distributions can deplete assets other-
wise available to satisfy tort judgments. In that event, the potential
problem of asset insufficiency can be remedied by imposing personal
liability on members in proportion to their compensation. In short, law
firm members who receive the most compensation from the firm will carry
proportionally greater responsibility and bear the costs if the firm does not
implement reasonable measures to control malpractice. Finally, the
implementation of reasonable controls also satisfies attorneys' obligations
under state ethical rules, which are based on Model Rule 5. 1"1 and the
recently adopted New York disciplinary rule requiring law firms, as well
as firm partners, "to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all firm
lawyers conform to the disciplinary rules." 94
A simple malpractice case illustrates how the proposal would work.
Assume that a litigation associate fails to file a timely answer, resulting
Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 388 (1992). For a discussion
of the procedural obstacles that may frustrate the implementation of a proportionate liability
scheme, see generally Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a
Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1992).
193. Model Rule 5.1(a) provides that a "partner in a law firm shall make reason-
able efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that
all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct." MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1(a) (1996). Ethics expert Michael Franck believes
that Model Rule 5.1 imposes an ethical duty on all partners to set up practices and proce-
dures to insure compliance with the rules of professional responsibility. See Jerome Fish-
kin, Ethics Liability for Acts and Omissions of Partners, in 5 LEGAL MALPRACTICE REP.
10, 11-12 (1996) (reviewing cases holding attorneys ethically culpable for misdeeds of
their partners). For a commentary on partners' duty to monitor compliance with ethi-
cal rules, see ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 423 (3d ed.
1996).
194. Although the New York rule appears to be similar to Model Rule 5.1, the New
York rule goes one step further in imposing liability on law firms, stating that a "law firm
shall adequately supervise, as appropriate, the work of partners, associates and nonlawyers
who work at the firm." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1205(c) (1996). In
adopting this rule, New York became the first in the nation to impose professional discip-
line on law firms. See Ann Davis, N.Y. Makes Firms Liable, NAT'L. L.J., June 10, 1996,
at A6.
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in a multi-million dollar judgment against a firm client. When the client
sues the firm and the partners, courts could hold firm partners liable if
the amount of malpractice insurance and other firm assets would not cover
the judgment. In that event, the firm partners could avoid personal
liability if they affirmatively plead the liability shield and show that
they acted reasonably in implementing measures to control the risk, such
as a docket control system. If the firm partners could not show that they
acted reasonably in attempting to prevent the litigation malpractice, then
courts could hold firm partners personally liable in proportion to their
compensation. 95
Unlike the current liability scheme under LLP and LLC legislation
that encourages externalization by undercapitalized firms, this approach
creates incentives which promise to benefit firm members, as well as
clients and other third parties who deal with the firm. First, the pro rata
approach to imposing liability encourages firm members with the most at
stake to influence firm decisions relating to insurance and malpractice
avoidance. If these firm members understand that they will be personally
liable in the event of asset insufficiency, they are more likely to support
the purchase of malpractice insurance. Second, the scheme encourages all
firm partners to support the implementation of reasonable measures to
avoid malpractice. In particular, the pro rata approach puts pressure on
the most influential and highly compensated firm members to orchestrate
the implementation of malpractice controls.
While this approach provides incentives for firms to purchase insur-
ance and to implement procedures to control risk, the scheme still gives
firm principals the freedom to choose how they want to handle the costs
of malpractice.'9 Unlike legislation that conditions the liability shield on
the firm's maintaining a certain level of insurance or capitalization, this
approach gives firm members the ability to choose how they want to
handle the matter, changing the basic incentive problems associated with
195. Another example involves a malpractice claim arising out of business transactions
with firm clients. If firm insurance and assets do not cover the amount of the malpractice
judgment, firm partners could be personally liable unless they show that they acted reason-
ably in controlling the risk by adopting policies prohibiting business transactions with clients
and prohibiting the use of firm letterhead for personal business dealings. On the other hand,
firm partners could be held liable if they failed to implement a conflicts system to detect
business transactions with clients and permitted the firm partner to use firm bank accounts
for depositing investor funds.
196. For example, firm attorneys may elect to implement internal controls when
insurance policies exclude certain types of claims, such as claims brought by federal banking
regulators.
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the current limited liability scheme. 197 For example, rather than purchas-
ing an indemnity policy, a firm may self-insure. On the other hand, firm
members who do not want to implement malpractice avoidance controls
may elect not to do so, understanding that the cost may be personal
liability in the event that firm insurance and assets fall short of satisfying
a tort judgment.
Although this approach still exposes attorneys to some risk of per-
sonal liability, it eliminates the possibility of strict vicarious liability for
the acts or omissions of another partner. Attorneys should prefer this pro
rata liability over joint and several liability because it relates an individual
partner's costs of participating in the law firm directly to benefits the
individual receives from the enterprise.
VII. Conclusion
After opening with the lament, "Where were the professionals?," this
Article explored attorneys' efforts to seek shelter from vicarious liability.
Law firm attorneys welcomed the advent of LLPs and LLCs, viewing
them as a panacea for malpractice liability for the conduct of other firm
actors. In the flurry to reorganize as LLPs and LLCs, attorneys have
ignored or dismissed problems and adverse consequences of these new
liability structures. As illustrated above, the current limited liability rules
can negatively impact firm insiders and persons who deal with the firms.
Empirical evidence must be obtained. to gauge how these new liability
forms will actually affect attorney perspectives, conduct, and responsibili-
ties to clients. Considering the possible internal and external conse-
quences of firms' converting to LLPs and LLCs, this Article ends by
asking: "Where is the profession and professionalism in the new landscape
of limited liability law firms?"
First, attorneys should recognize the uncertainty surrounding these
new liability structures.19 Without the guidance of an established body of
197. For a critique of coverage-oriented reforms as alternatives to unlimited liability,
see Hausmann & Kraakman, supra note 172, at 1927. In addition to enforcement problems,
coverage-oriented reforms appear to be inflexible and geared toward the smallest firms. For
example, the Texas LLP legislation requiring that firms maintain at least $100,000 insurance
coverage enables small firms to afford the purchase of insurance, but falls short of requiring
a meaningful level of insurance for larger firms.
198. Even Professor Larry Ribstein, a supporter of limited liability structures, recog-
nizes that the "future of LLCs is uncertain." Ribstein, supra note 21, at 47-48 (noting that
unanswered questions relate to lack of uniformity in LLC statutes and whether other
business forms will supersede LLC structure). Other authors express similar sentiments.
See Daniel S. Goldberg, The Tax Treatment of Limited Liability Companies: Law in Search
TRAPS OF IAMITED LIABT LAW FIRMS
law to resolve problems, courts may resolve disputes using established
corporate and partnership doctrine."' Courts also may extend or modify
traditional rules to fit the new liability structures. For example, courts
must determine if aggrieved persons should be able to pierce the LLC veil
and hold LLC members jointly and severally liable.2" Given the lack of
uniformity in LLP and LLC legislation, interstate problems and conflicts
of law questions will inevitably arise."1 Although commentators have
suggested an approach courts should use in resolving these problems, 2'
attorneys should appreciate the risks associated with practicing in limited
liability firms.
of Policy, 50 Bus. LAW. 995, 1017 (1995) (concluding that "[jludgment will have to be
reserved... until both the inmnediate fate and long-term effects of the [LLC] changes are
known").
199. In discussing the uncertainty surrounding LLCs, Professor Wayne M. Gazur
predicted that the "LLC's future will be marked by legislative, judicial, regulatory, and
practitioner experimentation with the new entity, revisiting issues already settled in other
contexts. The law relating to the long-standing forms of business organization will not be
irrelevant, because LLC law will develop through a heavy emphasis on analogy." Gazur,
supra note 7, at 138.
200. Although corporate rules applicable to piercing the corporate veil have been devel-
oped through common law, LLC statutes may adapt the corporate rules to LLCs. Robert
R. Keatinge & George W. Coleman, Professional Practices, PLANNING AND USING LIMITED
LIABILITY VEHICLES: LIMrTED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED LIABILrrY COMPANIES,
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, AND LIMITED LIABILITY LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, Q243 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 203, 228 (1996). One author predicts that the courts in states whose statutes do not
explicitly adopt corporate law rules will still pierce the "limited liability company veil" if
the courts find policy reasons for doing so. See Dennis S. Karjala, Planning Problems in
the Limited Liability Company, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 455, 464 (1995).
201. For an analysis of the conflict of law issues raised by interstate LLC transactions,
see Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging
Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375, 449-456 (1992) and P. John Kozyris, The Conflicts-of-Laws
Aspects of the New American Business Entity: The Limited Liability Company, 43 AM. J.
COMP. L. 417, 417-25 (1995). See also Dzienkowski, supra note 155, at 987-88 (discussing
forum shopping as problem that partners in multistate law firms will encounter in attempting
to rely on statutory liability shields).
202. See Hester, supra note 99, at 62; Martin I. Lubaroff, Registered Limited Liability
Partnerships: The Next Wave, in FORMING AND USING LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND
LIMITED LiABILrrY PARTNERSHIPS 1994, at 503, 536 (PLI Corp. L. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 836, 1994) (asserting that under full faith and credit and comity
principles, another state should respect partners' election to form their partnership under,
and to be governed by, laws of certain state). For a review of recent cases that address
jurisdictional issues, see Marilyn B. Cane & Helen R. Franco, Limited Liability in Regis-
tered Limited Liability Partnerships: How Does the Florida RLLP Measure Up?, 20 NOvA
L. REV. 1299, 1309-10 (1996).
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Second, attorneys should understand that the new liability structures
do not provide an impervious shield against liability. Courts in their
exercise* of inherent authority to regulate the legal profession may reject
the liability shield and refuse to allow firm attorneys to externalize the costs
of law firm practice.' In regulating the legal profession, a court could
narrow the liability shield using an approach such as the one proposed in
Part VI of this Article. Even if courts recognize statutory liability limits,
plaintiffs may attempt to avoid liability limits by fashioning claims that fall
outside the statutory language. Therefore, conversion to a limited liability
firm may not provide the shelter that attorneys desire. Finally, attorneys
should consider the negative impact on attorneys practicing in LLPs or
LLCs. As discussed above, the limited liability structure dramatically alters
the dynamics of law firm practice. No longer do attorneys approach repre-
sentation and firm problems with an "all for one, one for all" mentality.'
Instead, practitioners risk personal liability if they become involved in
the work of other attorneys or firm employees. Through this trans-
formation, attorneys no longer function as a team with collective responsi-
bility; rather, they coexist as a confederation of individuals sharing office
space.' This abandonment of collective responsibility threatens the quality
of legal services and risks unraveling the thread that holds together firm
attorneys.
Rather than seeking shelter through limited liability structures that lead
attorneys to dodge responsibility for their colleagues and subordinates,
professionals should adopt structures promoting collective responsibility in
serving clients.' Such an approach helps attorneys appreciate that the
203. See supra note 41.
204. From the feminist perspective, limited liability in law firms undermines the "webs
of interconnectedness" and destroys a sense of group responsibility. As explained by one
feminist scholar: "Tort law should begin with a premise of responsibility rather than rights,
of interconnectedness rather than separation, and a priority of safety rather than profit or
efficiency." Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3, 31 (1988).
205. For a discussion of the differences in a confederation style and a team approach
to group law practice, see MARY ANN ALTMAN & ROBERT I. WEIL, AN INTRODUCTION To
LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT 41-46 (2d ed. 1987).
206. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV.
589, 646-47 (1985) (urging that "the profession fashion structures within and across employ-
ing institutions that can encourage collective support and sense of responsibility for norma-
tive concerns"). By assuming collective responsibility, firm attorneys recognize that bureau-
cratic failings and collective decisions play a significant causal role in unethical conduct in
law firms. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discoline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 20 (1991) (referring to organizational roots of unethical conduct in firms).
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"contours of professionalism"' must include client interests.' 8
For years, professionalism crusaders have railed against the decline of
professionalism as evidenced by litigation incivility.' This conceptualiza-
tion of professionalism could be viewed as inwardly directed, focusing on
attorneys' dealings with one another."' 0 Similarly, the movement of attor-
neys to limit their liability amounts to an inwardly directed initiative,
protecting attorneys at the expense of clients and other malpractice
victims." Instead of elevating their self-interests above client interests and
the public interest, attorneys must "redirect their work organizations to
better achieve professional ideals" of accountability and competency.2 2 The
legal community should "turn from lamenting the decline of professionalism
to the more important work of improving the delivery of legal services." 21 3
207. One commentator asserts that limited liability will change the "contours of profes-
sionalism" and undermine the "traditional defenses of professional privilege" such as self-
regulation. John Flood, Megalaw in the U.K: Professionalism or Corporatism? A Prelimi-
nary Report, 64 IND. L. J. 569, 588, 591 (1989).
208. See Peter A. Joy, What We Talk About When We Talk About Professionalism: A
Review of Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in the American Legal
Profession, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETiICs 987, 1004 (1994) (book review) (arguing that scholar-
ship and bar reports on professionalism fail to discuss society's needs and expectations of
attorneys, essentially leaving public out of professionalism debate). By taking steps to
ensure the quality of services, the legal profession earns the privilege of self-regulation. See
ABEL, supra note 143, at 151 (explaining that "professions claim the privilege of self-
regulation on the ground that they not only correct misconduct but also ensure the quality
of the services they render").
209. As suggested by the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Honorable E.
Norman Veasey, the concern over professionalism extends beyond the concern over civility,
but should focus on the "aspects of professionalism which relate to competence, public
service, intellectual honesty, candor, independence, and the businesslike approach to the
profession." E. Norman Veasey, Professionalism and Pragmatism - The Future: A
Message from the Chief Justice of Delaware, 11 DEL. LAW. 13, 13 (1993).
210. For a thoughtful critique of the professionalism crusader's concern over incivility
and litigation abuse, see generally Roy Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Profes-
sionalism Crusade, 74 TEx. L. Ray. 259 (1995).
211. In some states, such as North Carolina, the debate over allowing attorneys to limit
their liability through LLCs revolved around "professionalism, or the notion that profession-
als are entrusted with significant public duties." Curt C. Brewer, IV, Comment, North
Carolina's Limited Liability Company Act: A Legislative Mandate for Professional Limited
Liability, 29 WAKE FOREST L. Rv. 857, 885-86 (1994).
212. See Robert L. Nelson, Of Tournaments and Transformations: Explaining the
Growth of Large Law Firms, 1992 Wis. L. Ray. 733, 749 (reviewing MARC GALANTER &
THOMAS PALAY, TOuRNAmENT OF LAWYERs (1991)).
213. Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Profes-
sional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rv.
1229, 1276 (1995).
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Unlike the current approaches to limited liability that undermine firm-
wide accountability and collective responsibility for competency, the pro-
posed limited liability rule protects clients as well as attorneys. By condi-
tioning limited liability on attorneys' reasonable efforts to implement
malpractice avoidance measures, the proposal couples professionalism with
protection. If firm attorneys act professionally in attempting to control
malpractice, they earn a shield against joint and several liability. In short,
this alternative approach to limited liability protects firm attorneys if they
make reasonable efforts to protect clients. Such an approach promises to
serve attorneys, their clients, and the legal profession.
NOTES

